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This technical note1 discusses the application of economic evidence in health technology 
assessments for decision-making on the allocation of health resources. There is already 
recognition in Latin America that the economic dimensions of health interventions, such 
as cost-effectiveness and budgetary impact, are critical dimensions that should always 
be considered when making decisions about the coverage or inclusion of technologies 
in benefits packages. However, there are still barriers and constraints that prevent the 
evaluation of economic evidence in the region from being an integral part of all decision-
making processes, with serious implications for the equity and efficiency with which health 
resources are allocated. The purpose of this technical note is to provide elements and tools 
that contribute, in a practical way, to overcoming these barriers, answering the questions 
asked by health systems that are beginning to apply economic evidence in their evaluation 
and decision-making processes. How do we know if a technology or intervention is cost-
effective in our context? What cost-effectiveness threshold should be applied? How might 
non-economic criteria and dimensions influence our cost-effectiveness threshold? What limit 
should be considered when a technology implies a high budgetary impact in a particular 
health system? Given the existing difficulties in generating local economic evidence, what can 
the economic evidence generated in other jurisdictions tell us? How can economic evidence 
be taken into account in a fragmented health system? Consideration of these aspects is key 
to ensuring fairer, more transparent allocation of health resources and thus achieving more 
efficient and equitable health systems in Latin America.
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Health systems around the world must now operate under increasingly complex political, 
economic, and technical conditions: rapid technological change, pressure to introduce new 
preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, or rehabilitation interventions, an aging population, and 
health budgets that account for larger proportions of countries’ gross domestic product 
each year.
The countries of Latin America have achieved significant health gains in recent decades, 
with steady progress toward universal health coverage (UHC) throughout the region. 
Nonetheless, health systems in Latin America face the same complexities today as those in 
the rest of the world, compounded by the persistence of significant inequities, inefficiencies, 
and suboptimal health outcomes (Dmytraczenko, 2015; Cotlear et al., 2015; Atun et al., 2015).
Among the action that the governments of most Latin American countries have taken to tackle 
these challenges is the creation of health technology assessment (HTA) programs, units, 
or agencies that participate, with a greater or lesser degree of institutionality, in decision-
making on health resource allocation. This process involves deciding which technologies 
and interventions will be covered with their health system’s limited resources or included in 
benefits packages.
How to make these difficult decisions as fairly as possible is, or should be, a major concern 
of health decision-makers. Selection of the criteria and dimensions to be considered when 
assessing the value of health technologies and decisions on their coverage or inclusion 
in benefits packages should reflect the overall objectives of the health system (e.g., the 
maximization of population health and financial protection), as well as other values relevant 
to society (i.e., equity, solidarity, access to quality health care) (Oortwijn 2019). Virtually 
without exception, in all explicit decision-making processes in the region, the effectiveness 
and safety of technologies and interventions are key dimensions that must be rigorously 
assessed before making a coverage decision. However, there is also agreement in Latin 
America and the world over that if the goal is to maximize health, or more broadly, maximize 
population well-being, evaluating effectiveness and safety is not enough to achieve fairer, 
more efficient health systems.
There is general recognition in Latin America that the economic dimensions of technologies, 
such as their cost-effectiveness and budgetary impact, are critical dimensions that should 
always be evaluated and considered before making a coverage decision (Pichon-Riviere 
et al., 2019). However, there are still barriers and constraints that prevent the evaluation of 
economic evidence from being an integral part of all decision-making on the allocation of 
health resources in the countries of the region. This has serious implications for both equity 
and the efficiency with which health resources are allocated in Latin America.
Because resources are limited, the decision to cover or include a particular technology in the 
benefits package implies that those resources will not be available for other technologies or 
interventions, or that resources will have to be shifted from interventions currently covered, 
making them no longer available or less accessible. Thus, an evaluation and decision-making 
process that does not consider both the costs and benefits of interventions and does 
Introduction not permit comparison of the relationship between the cost and benefits of the different 
alternatives will not be able to account for these aspects. This is true for low- and high-
income countries alike, as all without exception face budgetary constraints. Paradoxically, it 
is often high-income countries that have stricter structures, mechanisms, and processes for 
prioritizing the services to be financed with public resources.
While several Latin American countries have for years made the assessment of economic 
evidence (mainly cost-effectiveness and budgetary impact) a requirement in their decision-
making processes (Augustovski et al., 2015), there are still barriers that limit the scope of 
these assessments. This implies suboptimal decision-making processes that in many cases 
end up with unfair and inefficient implicit rationing, resulting in low coverage of priority cost-
effective services in several countries of the region, with some of the resources allocated to 
expensive and inefficient non-priority services. 
This technical note discusses the application of economic evidence to health technology 
assessment and decision-making on health resource allocation. The objective is to provide 
a series of key elements and tools that help pave the way for countries or health systems in 
Latin America that are making progress in strengthening their decision-making processes.
Specifically, it seeks to provide practical answers for some of the questions that health 
systems ask when beginning to apply economic evidence in their decision-making on 
the coverage of technologies and their inclusion in benefits packages: How can we know 
whether a certain technology or intervention is cost-effective in a particular context? What 
cost-effectiveness threshold must be applied?  What other criteria and dimensions, beyond 
the economic, could influence the cost-effectiveness threshold? When does a technology 
to imply a high budgetary impact in a particular health system? How can the economic 
dimension be taken into account when no studies have been conducted in the jurisdiction in 
question? How can economic evidence be taken into account if the country has a fragmented 
health system?
With these elements, we hope to contribute to overcoming some of the barriers that limit the 
effective use of economic evidence in decision-making on the allocation of health resources 
in the region. This technical note discusses seven key issues. The first two chapters, deal with 
more general topics. Chapter 1 discusses how to prioritize the technologies to be assessed, 
since any assessment requires time and effort, and it is essential that health technology 
assessment (HTA) agencies make efficient use of their own resources. For this, the chapter 
proposes elements and tools to consider when prioritizing. Chapter 2 discusses value 
frameworks, seeking to define the dimensions that should be considered when assessing 
the value of health technologies. For transparent and legitimate evaluation and decision-
making, it is essential to explicitly define the criteria and dimensions to consider, including 
the importance of economic dimensions such as cost-effectiveness and budgetary impact. 
This chapter presents international and regional experiences and elements that can guide 
this process.
The five remaining chapters are related to specific aspects of the evaluation of the economic 
dimension. Chapter 3 analyzes how to determine the opportunity cost in health, the most 
important reference to consider when determining whether a technology or intervention 
is cost-effective in a particular health system, and proposes a methodology for estimating 
the opportunity cost in health for each of the countries of the region. Chapter 4 analyzes 
thresholds and modifiers of decision-making, discusses how different countries and health 
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systems take dimensions other than the economic into account when assessing the value 
of technologies, and proposes a frame of reference for countries that are developing their 
decision-making processes. Chapter 5 discusses the dimension of budgetary impact and 
affordability. Based on international experiences, it proposes methodologies and reference 
values to enable Latin American countries to set the values that should determine whether 
a certain technology or intervention could represent a high budgetary impact. Since many 
countries may struggle to obtain local economic evidence, Chapter 6 presents mechanisms 
for taking advantage of economic information and evidence from other jurisdictions. Finally, 
Chapter 7 analyzes how to evaluate and apply economic evidence in fragmented systems 
(with public subsystems for provinces, states, or regions or subsystems for social security 
or private systems, etc.); it also proposes tools for tailoring the available information to 
existing decision-making processes.
This technical note is based on a report produced by the authors in 2019 at the request of 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on the use of economic evidence for making 
coverage decisions for Argentina. It discussed some key technical issues at the time that 
a health technology assessment agency could face in its initial years, especially the use of 
economic evidence for decision-making on the allocation of health resources. This report 
benefitted from the active technical support of the IDB team and its Criteria Network.
The authors wish to thank the institutions and experts who participated in the working 
meetings for the preparation of that first report, whose ideas and contributions enriched the 
discussions and gave rise to much of the material presented in this technical note. See the 
Annex for further information. 
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1. HOW TO PRIORITIZE INTERVENTIONS AND 
TECHNOLOGIES FOR EVALUATION PURPOSES
Even the richest, most developed countries do not have the resources and technical capacity 
necessary to assess all health technologies. Priorities must therefore be set – ideally, through 
an explicit process – to determine what will be assessed with the available technical and 
financial resources. This is particularly important in low- and middle-income countries that 
have fewer resources to conduct health technology assessments.
In addition to the need to make efficient use of the resources of HTA agencies, since all 
technologies will not be evaluated, there is a risk of producing serious distortions in decision-
making on the use of health resources unless there are clear and explicit mechanisms to 
guide the prioritization process (Drummond et al., 2008). Determining which technologies 
will be evaluated can influence the final coverage decision as much as the evaluation process 
itself.
The first part of this chapter discusses some of the most important aspects of the prioritization 
process. It then presents a series of key elements to be considered when establishing and 
implementing prioritization processes for the technologies to be evaluated by HTA agencies, 
with a particular focus on low- and middle-income countries.
1.1 Definition of HTA agencies’ mandate and responsibilities as a 
first priority-setting decision
Health technologies include the medicines, devices, procedures, and organizational systems 
that are used in the health system. One of the first decisions to be made when establishing an 
HTA agency, therefore, is whether it will have responsibilities for a wide range of technologies. 
Some of the HTA agencies around the world that conduct assessments to inform pricing 
and reimbursement decisions, such as Australia’s PBAC (Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory 
Committee) and Scotland’s SMC (Scottish Medicines Consortium), focus solely on medicines. 
The responsibilities of other agencies focus on the needs of a particular organization – for 
example, Germany’s IQWIG (Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen 
[Institute for Quality and Efficiency in the Health System]) which responds to the needs of 
national health insurance (the Krankenkassen). Other agencies have broader responsibilities. 
For example, NICE (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) in the United Kingdom 
has programs to evaluate medicines, devices, public health interventions, and social 
assistance programs. Ideally, the HTA agency in a particular jurisdiction should evaluate a 
wide range of technologies, as there is no reason to believe that inefficiency in resource use 
is differentially associated with some types of technology rather than others (Drummond et 
al., 2008).
Other aspects of an HTA agency’s responsibilities that will need to be defined from the 
outset include determining whether it will be responsible only for making recommendations 
on the inclusion or reimbursement of technologies, or also for regulating or negotiating 
prices or whether its recommendations will be mandatory or merely “advisory.”
Each country’s decisions on how the HTA agency will be structured, what its mandate   and 
responsibilities will be, and, above all, how HTA will be linked to the decision-making process 
are the basic elements that will determine the characteristics of the HTA agency in each 
jurisdiction.
1.2. Criteria and processes for priority setting
Once the HTA agency is up and running, it is to be expected that, sooner or later, evaluation 
needs will exceed the available resources and capacities. Thus, the need to prioritize which 
evaluations will be carried out first is inevitable. In many low- and middle-income countries 
that begin their HTA process late, this situation is often present from the moment the HTA 
agency is established, as it must deal with a pent up unmet demand for evaluations.
Prioritization of the technologies and interventions to be evaluated involves different 
elements: identification of the important problems for decision makers, identification of 
technologies that could respond to priority health needs or problems, identification of 
possible evaluations that could help decision makers, and rendering a judgement about the 
potential benefits and costs of possible evaluations and determining their priority (Henshall 
et al., 1997).
While no two countries, agencies, or health systems in the world prioritize interventions the 
same way, and no criteria can be considered universal or standard procedures, most HTA 
agencies appear to take certain common elements into account.
Noorani et al. studied the procedures followed by 11 HTA agencies from 10 countries when 
prioritizing the technologies to evaluate. Their goal was to identify the criteria on which 
these decisions were based. They found that the most common criteria were related to both 
clinical and economic impact (cost-effectiveness and budgetary impact). Other frequently 
mentioned criteria were the burden of disease that the technology aims to address, the 
expected level of interest in the evaluation, the availability of scientific evidence, the 
timeliness of the evaluation (its appropriateness, based on decision-making times), and the 
degree of controversy surrounding the technology and the variability of its use (Noorani et 
al., 2007).
A systematic review of the literature and websites of all European HTA INAHTA (International 
Network of Agencies for Health Technology Assessment) member agencies found that 
criteria most often used to prioritize the technologies to evaluate were their potential 
benefits, costs, and cost-effectiveness and the burden of disease (Specchia et al., 2015).
A 2017 review by Varela-Lema et al. found that most HTA agencies seemed to consider eight 
critical domains when prioritizing the technologies to evaluate: 1) need for intervention; 2) 
health outcomes; (3) the type of benefit from the intervention; (4) economic implications; 
5) existing knowledge about the intervention/quality and uncertainty of the evidence; 6) 
implementation and complexity of the intervention/feasibility; (7) priority, justice, and ethics; 
and 8) global context (Varela-Lema et al., 2017).
1.3. Linking priority setting to decision-making processes
In some jurisdictions, there is a link between the selection of technologies to be evaluated 
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and the decision-making process. For example, in the Netherlands, new drugs that are 
similar to existing drugs on the market are not prioritized for a full formal evaluation. Once 
a rapid evaluation of their effectiveness determines that they are clinically equivalent to 
other options available in the country, they are assigned a reference price based on existing 
drugs without being subject to a more thorough evaluation (for example, cost-effectiveness 
studies are unnecessary). Conversely, if the manufacturer or sponsor of the technology 
claims that the product has advantages that would justify a higher price, a more detailed 
evaluation of the drugs is conducted.
Similarly, in England, new technologies that are clearly more cost-effective than NICE’s 
threshold of £20,000 per QALY are not subject to a detailed HTA and are usually included. 
Something similar happens with medical devices that save costs to the National Health 
Service.
In more general terms, prioritization of the technologies to be evaluated should consider the 
type of hearing to be held for the HTA documents and the decision-making responsibilities 
of that hearing. The clearest situation is when there is a committee that determines what 
treatments will be included in the benefits or coverage form or package. Since in these 
cases, the committee has a clear need for information and the ability to act on the results 
and recommendations of the HTA, the prioritization process for the initial evaluation of 
technologies should take these needs into account.
1.4. Discussion points for Latin American countries and 
preliminary proposal of prioritization mechanisms to be taken 
into account by the agencies
The following are some of the questions that may arise when defining the mechanisms for 
prioritizing the technologies to evaluate.
(a) What will the HTA agency’s mandate and responsibilities be? This involves clearly 
indicating which technologies are within its scope and which are not, bearing in mind that 
they should ideally cover a wide range of technologies (e.g., medicines, devices, procedures, 
public health and social assistance programs). At the same time, it also involves specifying 
the type of decisions that will be informed by the HTA, its audience, and its decision-making 
responsibilities.
(b) Should the possibility of establishing a procedure for active identification of the 
technologies to be evaluated be considered? These procedures, sometimes known as horizon 
scanning, can be performed for different purposes – for example, the early identification 
of technologies that could have an impact on the health system, or ensuring that the list 
of candidate technologies to evaluate is aligned with national health priorities or includes 
technologies and interventions with high potential social value (Oortwijn W, Jansen M, 2019). 
Particularly in low- and middle-income countries, the most valuable technologies to include 
in benefits packages are not necessarily the newest. Potentially effective and cost-effective 
technologies, such as some preventive programs, will not necessarily have a sponsor to 
request and promote their evaluation and may not be considered for evaluation by agencies 
in the absence of active mechanisms to detect and include them in the lists of technologies 
to be evaluated.
(c) Finally, is there a desire to establish an explicit procedure for prioritizing evaluation 
issues? While this is internationally recognized as a fundamental principle of good practice 
in HTA and is necessary to strengthen the legitimacy of decisions that will be informed by 
it, it has organizational and political implications. For example: resources are required to 
take it forward, and some decision-makers may view it negatively, as it could reduce their 
discretionary framework for decision-making.
Once it has been determined that a mechanism should be established for prioritizing the 
issues to evaluate, it should be noted that there are different levels in the decision-making 
process where this prioritization can be applied. As already mentioned, HTA agencies and 
health systems almost never have the capacity, or the mandate, to immediately evaluate all 
health technologies that receive regulatory approval. This implies that many technologies 
are often available in the country that have not yet been evaluated and whose coverage 
and/or inclusion in the benefits package has not yet been decided.
For example, the Constitution of the National Health Service of England (NHS) states that 
patients are entitled to receive drugs or treatments approved by assessments conducted by 
the HTA agency (NICE) if recommended by their doctor. For drugs or treatments that have 
not yet been evaluated, it states that coverage decisions should be “rational and evidence-
based.” This generates few conflicts in countries such as England, in which the indication and 
request for coverage of technologies not approved by the HTA agency is rare, and where 
the HTA agency also has the capacity to evaluate and decide on all potentially conflicting 
technologies.
In low- and middle-income countries, such as those of Latin America, the gap between 
available technologies and those explicitly evaluated and covered or defined in the benefits 
package is usually greater, and this can undermine the legitimacy of coverage decisions or the 
benefits package. It is also often one of the roots of the judicialization of the right to health 
confronting several countries in the region. For example, the PMO (Compulsory Medical Plan) 
in Argentina clearly indicates the medicines, devices, and procedures whose accessibility 
must be guaranteed to beneficiaries of the national social security and private systems 
(which provide coverage for approximately 20 million people, about half the population). 
However, the lack of clear mechanisms for updating the explicit package of coverage has 
made it simply the definition of the minimum coverage floor, leaving all the new technologies 
that have not yet been evaluated in limbo. Given this situation, while it is clear that there is 
mandatory coverage of all the technologies included in the benefits package (PMO), it is not 
clear that those that have not been evaluated and are not explicitly included in the package 
should not be covered. Denying coverage of a technology simply because it has not been 
evaluated and is not included in the PMO ends up being an argument that is not considered 
legitimate, either by society or the justice system, given the lack of explicit mechanisms for 
updating the PMO. Health funders are in the worst possible situation: required to provide 
everything included in the PMO but at the same time exposed to the demand for coverage 
of all technologies that have not yet been evaluated, which usually are precisely the newest, 
most controversial, and expensive technologies.
As mentioned at the outset, prioritizing the technologies and interventions to evaluate 
implies that there will be technologies that will not be evaluated, at least for a certain period. 
This is correct and is precisely what gives meaning to the notion of prioritizing.  However, 
especially in countries in the early stages of implementing health technology assessment 
processes, prioritizing assessments can be perceived as one more strategy for limiting 
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coverage: the technology is not evaluated and therefore not covered.
To lend more legitimacy to the process, it is valid to consider mechanisms that assure the 
population that things that are “really important” will be identified. In this context, it may be 
useful to establish active prioritization procedures that guarantee the various social actors 
(i.e., users, the judicial system, industry, patients) that all technologies and interventions 
that represent a potentially high value for society will be evaluated as a priority, and that a 
decision on their coverage will be made within certain reasonable deadlines (for example, 
less than 6-12 months from their regulatory approval or the request for their inclusion in 
coverage). The definition of “really important” or “of high value to society” will vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and is discussed in the next chapter on value frameworks.
Having such a mechanism cannot only enable the benefits package to serve as a list of 
everything that must be covered, but would give it the legitimacy to determine the non-
compulsory coverage of technologies not on the list.
With all this in mind, the following could be some of the criteria to consider in identifying 
technologies that should be given high priority for evaluation:
• There is reasonable certainty (lower threshold of 95% confidence interval [95% CI] in 
clinical trials) that the technology can offer patients with serious life-threatening diseases 
additional survival of at least 3 months, or its equivalent in quality-of-life improvement 
(at least 0.2 QALYs). This category could include, for example, treatments for cancer and 
other serious diseases that have demonstrated clear benefits in terms of overall survival. 
• The scope of the intervention or technology could potentially be broad, producing health 
benefits in more than 10% of the country’s population, and there is reasonable certainty 
about its effectiveness (e.g., good clinical studies showing a magnitude of effect that can 
be considered clinically relevant across the CI95% range). This category could include, 
for example, prevention programs, vaccinations, or other public health interventions. 
• The technology or intervention is aimed at meeting needs aligned with pre-established 
Ministry of Health priorities, and there is reasonable certainty about its effectiveness 
(for example, through good clinical studies showing a magnitude of effect that can 
be considered clinically relevant throughout the CI95% range). This category could 
include, for example, interventions for neglected conditions such as Chagas disease. 
• There are strong indications, based on the available evidence, that the 
technology could be as or more effective than current treatments and 
would represent a lower cost to the health system (cost-saving technology). 
• There are strong indications, based on the available evidence, that the technology 
could yield significant benefits in other socially relevant dimensions (see next chapter 
on value frameworks). For example, an intervention or technology with a high potential 
for reducing inequities – for example, by improving access and outcomes in vulnerable 
populations (e.g., a test for cervical cancer screening in rural populations).
These criteria are proposed as an example of a “filter” or “triage” to assure society that all 
interventions and technologies that could potentially be “of great value” will be prioritized 
in a special way for evaluation and that the decision on their coverage or inclusion in the 
benefits package will therefore be made within a specific and reasonable period of time. 
Beyond this example, each jurisdiction will need to set its own criteria to determine when 
it will consider a technology a high priority for evaluation, and these criteria should be 
aligned with social values. As previously mentioned, each society determines the elements 
it considers important differently when assessing the value of a technology, a point that will 
be addressed in the next chapter on value frameworks. 
The main function of a mechanism such as the one described here is to bring peace of mind 
to the different actors in society, ensuring that all potentially very relevant technologies have 
been evaluated and a decision about them has been made, or that they are currently being 
evaluated. Therefore, the fact that a technology is not included in the benefits package or is 
not covered is a sufficient argument for not providing coverage, since it means it has either 
already been evaluated and rejected or is being evaluated and must wait for the process to 
be completed before a coverage decision is made. 
As an additional mechanism that could improve perceptions of the legitimacy of the benefits 
package and coverage decisions, consideration may be given to the option that some 
technologies that meet these high-priority criteria for evaluation and have already obtained 
approval by the regulatory agency may be covered as an exception until the evaluation 
process is completed and a final decision is made on their inclusion in the benefits package. 
This would be a mechanism similar to that applied in other countries (for example, Germany 
or even in certain respects, the United Kingdom), allowing certain new technologies to be 
financed for a limited period of time until a decision has been reached on the matter. With 
sufficiently strict criteria, not many technologies would be identified as priorities each year 
(for example, no more than 10 or 15), and with proper coordination with the regulatory 
agency, it would be easy to identify them early (for example, through horizon scanning) and 
begin a parallel evaluation to obtain a coverage decision at the same time, or almost the 
same time, as regulatory approval. This mechanism could reduce judicialization proceedings, 
since it would give the benefits package even greater legitimacy to act as an exclusion list 
as well, though withdrawing coverage if the subsequent evaluation does not recommend its 
incorporation is also more complicated.
Another important element is the proactive search and identification of technologies and 
interventions by HTA agencies. Which makes it possible to identify promising, potentially 
effective and cost-effective interventions that are not being widely used or promoted 
because they do not have a specific sponsor to advocate for their coverage or inclusion in 
a benefits package; for example, a colon cancer screening program, cardiovascular disease 
prevention interventions, or guidelines or protocols such as pre-surgical evaluation to avoid 
unnecessary use of resources. This methodology improves the legitimacy of the benefits 
package, assuring society that all potentially relevant technologies and interventions have 
been considered and also serves to align the work of the HTA agency with national health 
priorities that, especially in middle- and low-income countries, may not be only related to 
new technologies.
However, beyond the high-priority technologies to be evaluated that could be subject to 
a different procedure such as the one proposed here, it is common for HTA agencies to 
have a long list of candidate technologies to be evaluated. This list can be compiled from 
different sources. The technologies can be identified by the agency itself (for example 
through horizon scanning); requested by hospitals, provincial or state health secretariats, or 
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other Ministry of Health entities; or requested for inclusion in coverage or benefits packages 
by different actors (such as patients and users, industry, or healthcare professionals). For 
example, several Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay, 
have open nomination mechanisms for evaluating and including technologies in benefits 
packages.
As a result of the prioritization process, technologies that do not require evaluation can also 
be identified, since a decision can be made without the need for an exhaustive evaluation. 
In other words, the value added that the evaluation could provide in terms of information 
is so low that it is not worth investing the resources required to conduct it.  For example, 
technologies for which there is no solid evidence of their effectiveness and/or safety can 
be excluded from coverage without the need for a more thorough evaluation (it would 
not be necessary to evaluate their cost-effectiveness or other dimensions, for example). As 
previously mentioned for the Netherlands and countries such as France and Germany, full 
evaluations are not required for all medicines. If a new drug proves effective but not superior 
to other, currently available treatments, and the manufacturer agrees to have its price set in 
reference to these already available alternatives, it would not be necessary to move forward 
with a full evaluation, and the drug could be included. A different situation may arise if the 
manufacturer considers its medicine superior to the alternatives and claims the right to 
set a higher price. In that case, a more complete evaluation (including, for example, a cost-
effectiveness analysis) would be necessary to determine whether the additional benefits 
of this new drug justifies the health system paying a higher price than it currently pays for 
existing alternatives. Other cases, such as interventions that are clearly cost-saving or more 
cost-effective than their alternatives, or technologies that are clearly superior and represent 
a very low budgetary impact compared to their comparators, could also be cases in which 
a full evaluation is not required for a decision to be made.
1.5. Final remarks
Having explicit transparent mechanisms to prioritize the technologies to be evaluated is one 
of the principles of HTA good practice (Drummond, 2008; Pichon-Riviere, 2018) and a key 
contribution to increasing the legitimacy of decisions. 
When establishing these mechanisms, each country must determine who may request 
evaluations or nominate or propose technologies for evaluation; the mechanisms for actively 
identifying candidate technologies (horizon scanning); the actors who can participate in 
the process; and the criteria and dimensions to consider in priority setting. Most agencies 
consider the following criteria: 1) burden of disease of the condition for which the technology 
is intended; 2) degree of benefit or clinical impact that it would provide; 3) economic impact 
that inclusion or coverage would produce; 4) existing uncertainty and importance of the 
information that an evaluation could provide for decision-making. 
Implementation of prioritization mechanisms should also involve the establishment of 
mechanisms for the proactive search for and identification of promising, potentially effective, 
and cost-effective technologies and interventions (horizon scanning) that are not being 
widely used or promoted, as they do not have a specific “sponsor.” This active methodology 
increases the legitimacy of the benefits package and serves to align the work of the HTA 
agency with national health priorities.
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2. VALUE FRAMEWORKS: DIMENSIONS TO BE 
CONSIDERED WHEN ASSESSING THE VALUE OF 
HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES
Although health technology assessment may have different objectives, one of the most 
important is to maximize the value gained from the use of health resources – that is, to 
maximize the “value for money” of the investments that the health system must make. This 
involves comparing the additional value of incorporating a new technology or intervention 
with the value that could be obtained from the best possible use of those same resources 
with other technologies or interventions (which in economic terms is known as “opportunity 
cost”). In other words, including a technology in coverage will produce a certain benefit; if 
the benefit obtained is greater than the benefit lost (or not obtained) by not having used 
those resources for other alternatives, then the decision to include the technology was 
correct.
This approach requires that the benefits of a given technology (the “value” in current 
terminology) be properly defined and quantified, which involves deciding the criteria and 
dimensions to consider when assessing its value. This is what is commonly called a “value 
framework.” This chapter addresses these important aspects.
2.1. Approaches used to assess the value of health technologies
The main aspects whose examination has been proposed to assess the value of health 
technologies are described below. 
Benefits in clinical outcomes
Assessing the clinical benefits of a new technology compared to its relevant alternatives is a 
central (if not the most important) aspect of value frameworks. Some frameworks consider 
only clinical benefits, regardless of how they are presented. This is the approach used in 
France and Germany in evaluating new medicines (Drummond et al,2014). Based on clinical 
data, an assessment is made about the “value added” by the new drug compared to existing 
alternatives (the greater the clinical benefit provided by the drug, the greater its “value”). 
The degree to which the new technology provides “value added” is then used to guide price 
negotiations with manufacturers. The more “innovative” a new technology, the more likely 
a higher value will be justified, even though in no country is there a one-to-one relationship 
between the assessment and the final price.
In other contexts, clinical benefits are assessed more systematically by including different 
dimensions when determining the value of a new technology. One example of this is the 
value framework used by the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO), which is 
designed for use in the context of patient-doctor decision-making (Schnipper et al., 2016). 
In this value framework, the evaluated drugs are assigned a score, taking into account the 
magnitude of the clinical benefit (progression-free survival or total survival, 0 to80) and 
adverse effects or the absence thereof (-20 to +20). Additional points (0 to 30) are also 
assigned if the drug is to be used in advanced stages of the disease. The objective is for 
the drug’s total score to be used by doctors, mainly in their conversations with patients, 
since in the United States, patients may have to make significant outlays to access some of 
these drugs. This approach does not include the costs and benefits of these drugs from the 
general perspective of the health system.
Cost savings
Although most of the benefits of health interventions are related to their impact on health, 
it is important to mention that some have the effect of reducing costs. The best example 
of this is certain preventive interventions, such as several immunization programs, which 
generate savings by reducing cases of the disease (savings that are greater than the costs 
of the vaccine and the implementation of the vaccination program). This is why in any 
assessment of health technologies, the cost considered is the net cost of their adoption, 
which includes both the additional costs and the savings generated by the implementation 
of the new technology.
Public health benefits
Although the evaluation of clinical benefits is a key aspect in the quantification of value, 
it has certain limitations. While the evaluation of certain clinical benefits may be useful 
within a specialty or for a health problem, those same clinical benefits are not necessarily 
generalizable or extrapolatable between different specialties or health problems. For 
example, the clinical benefits of a given intervention could be assessed in terms of avoided 
heart attacks. This measure of clinical benefit could be useful if the object is to compare 
the value of different interventions in preventing cardiovascular disease; an intervention 
that manages to prevent more heart attacks would be considered of greater value than one 
that prevents fewer heart attacks. However, this measure of benefit would not be helpful in 
measuring the value of cancer treatments. Many policymakers feel that this is a significant 
limitation, as they expect the evaluation of health technologies to provide information that 
permits optimization of the use of health resources for the health system as a whole and not 
just for a certain specialty or therapeutic area. This is why there has always been interest in 
developing “generic” units of measurement that can capture the health benefit in all areas 
of health. If this common measure or metric is used by the health system as a whole, then 
the benefits of different technologies or interventions can be evaluated homogeneously in 
terms of their incremental cost per unit of incremental benefit obtained.
Much of the literature on health technology assessment has focused on the use of two of 
these generic measures, the Quality-adjusted Life Year (QALY), which is used primarily in 
high- and middle-income countries, and the Disability-adjusted Life Year (DALY) developed 
by the World Bank and the World Health Organization, used primarily in low-income countries 
(Tan-Torres et al., 2003, Augustovski et al., 2018). Beyond the fact that there are differences 
in the specific methodology used in the development of these measures, what they have in 
common is that both are based on combining survival information with quality-of-life data, 
measured on a scale of 0 to 1(although in QALY, it is also possible to obtain scores below 0 
that mean worse states of health than death, although this aspect is not usually relevant in 
practice).
The use of QALYs and DALYs in health technology assessment is not without its critics. The 
main issue is that their construction involves certain questionable assumptions. Moreover, 
in many cases, it involves extrapolating the benefits of treatments throughout life through 
mathematical models. Beyond these criticisms, many decision-makers find that estimating 
the cost per QALY or DALY gained is useful information, since the main alternative, which 
would be a simple monetary value, also has its limitations.
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Furthermore, one of the criticisms of QALYs and DALYs is that they may not capture 
significant aspects of the value of a technology, which is closely related to the vision and 
values  of decision-makers in different contexts. In England and Wales, NICE’s vision is that 
the health budget should be executed in a way that maximizes the health gains of the 
population as a whole; thus, it relies primarily on estimating the incremental cost per QALY 
gained (although other aspects of technology can also be taken into account, as will be seen 
further on). However, maximizing the health gains of the population as a whole is not the 
only possible point of view. An alternative objective is the general welfare of the population, 
for which a decision-maker could consider other aspects of a technology’s value. Some 
of these additional aspects and dimensions of value were discussed in the recent ISPOR 
Special Task Force in Value Assessment (Garrison et al., 2018) (see Figure 2-1).
Figure 2-1 Potential elements of value that could be considered in economic 
assessments
Note: Green circles: core elements of value. Light blue circles: common but inconsistently used elements of 
value. Dark blue circles: potential novel elements of value. Blue line: value element included in traditional payer 
or health plan perspective. Red line: value element also included in societal perspective.
Source: Lakdawalla et al. (2018)
In this diagram by Lakdawalla et al., the dimensions in green are those usually included in 
the evaluation of the value of health technologies and considered key or “core” dimensions: 
costs and QALYs. Items in light blue are those that are sometimes included in the evaluations, 
such as the benefits of boosting labor productivity if a technology encourages individuals to 
remain economically active for longer or return to work earlier; and the benefits of increasing 
treatment adherence and consequently, the chances that the treatment will be effective (for 
example, a more comfortable form of administration). Finally, the dimensions in dark blue 
are rarely considered in evaluations, even though they could constitute an important part of 
the “value” of the technologies. These dimensions are:
• The value of reducing uncertainty about the diagnosis of a disease
• The value of protection against a contagious disease
• The value of patients being “insured” – that is, of having access to a certain technology, 
if necessary
• The added value of being a treatment for very serious diseases
• The value of patients’ expectation that they will benefit from a treatment
• The value of patients receiving a treatment that increases survival, enabling the 
emergence of more effective treatments in the future
• The value of greater equity in access to treatment, especially when a patient is denied 
it (likely due to a rare disease or the high cost of treatment)
• The value of research externalities that can promote innovation or the development 
of new treatments
This list helps to illustrate the point that there are many possible dimensions of a technology’s 
value, although most of them are not routinely considered by all health systems. This list, 
furthermore, is not exhaustive. For example, some policymakers may also wish to consider 
the impact on both costs and the quality of life of family members. 
Therefore, the first decision is to determine precisely which dimensions will be evaluated 
and considered to assess the value of technologies and interventions when deciding on 
their coverage or inclusion in the benefits package. The inclusion or exclusion of certain 
dimensions is critically dependent on the decision-makers’ values and vision when judging 
their relevance. It is also necessary to discuss how these dimensions should be measured 
and combined in the final assessment of a technology’s value.
2.2. Discussion points for Latin American countries and prelimi-
nary proposal of general guidelines for the definition of a value 
framework
In most countries, the benefit of technologies or interventions characterized in clinical terms 
or measured in QALYs or DALYs is a key component of value frameworks. Its measurement 
using QALYs or DALYs is the approach embraced by many of the international guidelines 
for health technology assessment or health economic assessment (Garrison et al., 2018; 
Wilkinson et al., 2016; Tan-Torres et al., 2003). It will therefore be very useful for any country 
that is beginning its evaluation process and considering inclusion of the economic dimension 
in its value framework to develop methodological guidelines for context-specific economic 
evaluation or at least adopt a previously developed “reference case” considered applicable 
to the local context.
24 25
However, as we have seen, countries or health systems may also wish to consider other 
dimensions and criteria beyond costs and QALYs/DALYs when assessing the value of 
technologies. Selection of the relevant criteria on which decisions will be based is one 
of the critical points in building transparency into the decision-making process. These 
criteria should reflect the overall objectives of the health system (usually defined as the 
maximization of population health, equal distribution of health, and financial protection), 
and other underlying social values such as equity, solidarity, and access to quality health 
care (Oortwijn 2019). Once the general objectives and values of the health system have 
been defined, they can be specified in a series of decision-making criteria that will comprise 
the value framework. This process should involve appropriate participation by the different 
actors to ensure that the value framework that is eventually defined effectively reflects 
social values.
Not all countries have gone through the process of exploring and explicitly defining a value 
framework. In fact, most HTA agencies in Latin America operate without a formal value 
framework. Nonetheless, these same agencies conduct technology assessments on a daily 
basis and make decisions or issue recommendations. These assessments are based on the 
dimensions and criteria they consider important and a judgment is made about how the 
technology performs in the dimensions evaluated. When issuing a recommendation, the 
agencies must consider the importance assigned to each criterion or dimension, based 
on what decision-makers consider the health system’s objectives, as well as other social 
values. In other words, there is always a “value framework” that guides the HTA process, 
even if it is merely implicit. For example, if in making decisions, a country assesses and 
considers the effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and budgetary impact of technologies, as 
well as the severity of the condition they are designed to treat, it means that these are 
the criteria and dimensions considered important when deciding on coverage. A judgment 
should also be made about how the technology performs in each dimension evaluated. For 
example, it must be determined whether the clinical benefit is relevant, cost-effective, or the 
budgetary impact is acceptable. Hence, there must be a rule, even if implicit and different 
for each decision-maker, that guides this determination. Finally, it is also necessary to have 
a position on the relative importance of each dimension or criterion, and it must be judged 
how to balance the performance among different dimensions and integrated them into a 
final assessment. 
For example, a technology could be effective and target a serious disease but have a high 
budgetary impact or not be very cost-effective. What would be the recommendation in this 
case? (See Chapter 4). When countries conduct assessments and make recommendations, 
there is always a value framework, even if implicit, often without decision-makers being fully 
aware of it. Nonetheless, the fact that it is not explicit has a number of implications. There 
is a risk that different decision-makers will use different value frameworks, that two similar 
technologies will be assessed differently, or that different decisions will be made for the 
same technology depending on when or where they are made. At the same time, there is 
no guarantee that the value framework in use adequately reflects what society considers 
important. 
Lack of an explicit value framework implies a lack of consistency and predictability and, above 
all, jeopardizes the transparency and legitimacy of decisions. An explicit value framework 
is a guide that enables those conducting the HTA to know which dimensions to evaluate; 
those responsible for issuing the recommendations to know how to assess their value; and 
patients, users, and manufacturers of the technologies and all stakeholders to have clear 
rules governing participation.
Defining a value framework implies determining which elements, domains, criteria, or 
dimensions will be considered when assessing the value of health technologies. As indicated 
above, the Special Task Force of ISPOR on Value Assessment Frameworks states that the 
evaluation of cost-effectiveness (with outcomes measured in QALYs) is the key element, 
although it mentions many other dimensions that could also be considered.
The 2018 HTAi Policy Forum of Latin America (HTA International Society) suggests that the 
essential elements to include in value frameworks are (Pichon-Riviere 2019):
• Effectiveness (magnitude and relevance of clinical benefit)
• Security
• Quality of evidence
• Burden of disease
• Severity of the disease
• Budgetary impact
• Cost-effectiveness
The Forum also mentions the following criteria as non-essential, but nevertheless high 
priority:
• Patient technology preferences
• Accessibility for patients
• Costs to patients and their family
• Impact on equity
• Impact on public health
Some countries and HTA agencies have defined the value framework they will use when 
assessing technologies. For example, CONETEC (National Commission for Technology 
Evaluation of Argentina) has established a group of dimensions/criteria in a value framework 
for new technology assessment that includes the following dimensions (CONETEC 2019):
• Quality of evidence
• Magnitude of clinical benefit
• Economic impact (budgetary impact and cost-effectiveness)
• Impact on equity
• Impact on public health
As can be seen, these groups of criteria largely overlap, since in order to obtain a reliable 
estimate of cost-effectiveness, the quality and relevance of the clinical evidence (such as 
efficacy-effectiveness, safety, quality of evidence) must be considered before including it in 
the estimation of QALYs gained and the uncertainty surrounding that estimate.
For Latin American countries that have not yet completed formal definition of their value 
framework, there are strong arguments to recommend that, until the framework is defined, 
decisions about the allocation of health resources should consider the following criteria:
• Magnitude and relevance of clinical benefit (Effectiveness)




• Impact on equity
• Impact on public health
The following criteria could also be considered to be among the essential criteria or other 
high-priority criteria:
• Burden of disease
• Severity of the disease
• Patient technology preferences 
• Accessibility for patients
• Costs to patients and their family
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3. DETERMINING THE OPPORTUNITY COST IN HEALTH
In order to reach a decision on coverage, inclusion in the benefits package, reimbursement, 
or price of a new technology, a decision rule is needed. In the literature, most of the 
discussion on decision-making rules took place within the context of the cost-effectiveness 
of interventions, especially the cost-effectiveness threshold. However, a decision rule is also 
necessary even if only clinical benefits are being considered. For example, in France, new 
medicines are assigned a category on the Added Medical Services Rendered (ASRM) scale 
ranging from 1 to 5. To be assigned an international price not limited by reductions based on 
local reference prices, the decision rule requires that the drug have a score of 1, 2, or 3 on 
this scale (Drummond et al., 2014). These decision rules allow health systems to determine 
whether the technologies they are assessing meet certain predefined requirements and 
thereby assist the decision-making process.
In the context of health technology assessments that include an economic evaluation, the 
discussion revolves around how this should be the decision rule for determining whether a 
given incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) is considered acceptable in the jurisdiction 
in question. The World Health Organization’s initiative on Generalized Cost-Effectiveness 
(Sachs, 2001), suggested at the time that countries could consider an intervention whose 
ICER was less than 1 GDP per capita per DALY as very likely cost-effective, or below 3 GDP per 
capita per DALY as likely cost-effective. Although some low- and middle-income countries 
continue to use the benchmark of a cost-effectiveness ratio of 1 GDP per capita when 
assessing the inclusion of new technologies, WHO no longer makes this recommendation 
and most Latin American countries do not have an explicit cost-effectiveness threshold.
3.1. Estimating the threshold
While many countries in the region have some decision rule, reference, or threshold for 
determining the cost-effectiveness of technologies, this rule is usually implicit. It is argued 
that making it explicit would reduce decision-makers’ flexibility and could lead to technology 
manufacturers raising their prices up to the threshold level, resulting in less cost-effective 
technologies (Wang et al., 2018). In contrast, the argument for making the decision rule or 
threshold explicit is that it makes the decision-making process more transparent and promotes 
greater consistency in decisions. The sections below describe various methodologies for 
estimating the threshold.
Threshold estimation based on opportunity cost
This is the approach preferred by most health economists. In this case, the opportunity 
cost threshold represents the shadow price in the current health budget constraint. In other 
words, the threshold represents the lost value of the health benefits of the technologies 
that will have to be displaced or cannot be covered to permit the introduction of the new 
technology. 
For example, given a fixed health budget, including and covering new expensive cancer 
treatments will mean that the health system will not be able to provide some existing services 
or technologies. If the health benefits obtained with the new treatments are greater than 
the lost benefits of the services that will be displaced, it will not be a problem, since the 
net gain in health will be positive (the benefits gained are greater than the benefits lost). If 
they are not and the benefits provided by the new treatments fail to offset the benefits that 
the system fails to obtain, then the net result will be less health for the system as a whole. 
Simply put, this opportunity cost threshold represents the cost-effectiveness of the services 
or technologies that will be displaced in the margin to introduce new technologies. If new 
technologies are above this threshold, the system as a whole will end up losing health. 
To put it in numbers: suppose the opportunity cost in a given country has been estimated 
at $1,000 per quality-adjusted life year (QALY). If this country includes a technology whose 
ICER is US$ 500 per QALY in its coverage, the net result will be positive, since it can be 
estimated that the technologies that cannot be financed due to the inclusion of this new 
technology would have a less favorable cost-effectiveness, as defined by the opportunity 
cost threshold (US$ 1,000 per QALY). On the other hand, if this country includes a technology 
with an ICER above the threshold (for example US$ 2,000 per QALY), it would be losing 
health, since the opportunity cost value precisely indicates that there could be more cost-
effective technologies that cannot be covered.
Even if a country decides not to base its decision rule on the opportunity cost, it is important 
to know what that value is, since it will enable it to know how much health is being lost or 
gained with each decision (Sculpher et al., 2017). Further on, we will see how the opportunity 
cost in health can be estimated and present estimates for the countries of the region.
Threshold estimation based on current practices of decision-makers
Another approach to determining the threshold is to review previous coverage decisions and 
estimate the threshold that was implicit in those decisions.  This was partly the approach 
used in the United Kingdom to reach the threshold used today by NICE. In a review of 
NICE’s first decisions (Devlin and Parkin, 2004), it was observed that the probability that 
an intervention would be rejected increased substantially when the incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio of the intervention was greater than £20,000 per QALY. Based on this 
investigation, NICE, which up to that point had had no explicit threshold, determined that 
it would use a threshold of £20,000 per QALY, which could be as high as £30,000 under 
special conditions.
This same approach was recently used in Japan, which included the requirement of cost-
effectiveness evidence as part of its drug pricing policy. While likely to lead to a higher 
comfort level for decision-makers, this approach is based on decisions made in the past. If 
the decisions were resulting in a misallocation of resources since the built-in interventions 
produced less health than the displaced ones, basing a threshold on these decisions would 
only perpetuate the problem.
Threshold estimation based on health spending aspirations
Although not explicit at the time, WHO’s original recommendation of a threshold of 1-3 GDP 
per capita was largely based on the level of anticipated health expenditure. While there is 
nothing wrong with aspiring to increase the health budget, the principle of opportunity cost 
implies that if the cost-effectiveness threshold used to decide on the introduction of new 
technologies is higher than the cost-effectiveness of technologies that could be displaced, 
then health will be lost unless the health budget is increased. Therefore, from the standpoint 
of opportunity cost, a threshold cannot be determined without taking the health budget into 
account (Culyer, 2017). Thus, a decision to use a threshold based on what is aspired to or 
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believed to be correct should be accompanied by a discussion on whether this implies that 
the health budget should be increased. In Latin America, we can find examples of what could 
be considered aspirational thresholds. For several years, Mexico recommended a threshold 
of 1 GDP per capita for interventions that were to be included in the “Basic Table,” and the 
methodological guide for conducting economic assessments in Chile suggests a threshold 
of 1 GDP per capita for an intervention to be considered cost-effective (Augustovski et al., 
2010).
Threshold estimation based on social preferences
From this perspective, the information to determine the threshold could be obtained 
from surveys of the population that ask about the willingness to pay for a year of life or 
QALY. This was attempted in Europe, but finding the appropriate way to ask the questions 
proved difficult. A review of published studies (Mason et al., 2008) found that the number 
individuals willing to pay for a QALY varies widely depending on the context. Beyond this, 
it was concluded that such estimates could be useful in informing the debate about cost-
effectiveness thresholds.
However, as we previously noted in regard to determining a threshold based on spending 
aspirations, it would not be reasonable to increase the threshold on the basis of social 
preferences without an increase in the health budget. Therefore, if these surveys on the 
willingness to pay for QALY/DALY can serve any purpose, it is to provide evidence about 
society’s eventual support for increasing the health budget.
3.2. Estimating the opportunity cost
As previously mentioned, regardless of the approach used to determine the decision rule 
or threshold in a given country, it is important to know the opportunity cost. In the United 
Kingdom, the debate surrounding the threshold used by NICE led to studies to estimate 
the opportunity cost, since they provide an empirical basis for setting the threshold. This 
research involved an econometric analysis that took health expenditure and its associated 
health outcomes (reduction in mortality) in different jurisdictions into account. The most 
important constraint was the lack of some basic data (for example, the studies used available 
mortality data but had to make assumptions about the effect on quality of life) and the lack 
of information on interventions shifted in the margin in different health areas with different 
levels of expenditure. Although there is no consensus on the best approach to estimating 
opportunity cost, several studies in the United Kingdom and other countries estimated 
opportunity cost values consistently lower than the thresholds currently used. In the United 
Kingdom, the estimate was approximately £13,000 (Claxton et al., 2015). In Spain, it was 
estimated at ¤22,000-¤25,000 per QALY (Vallejo-Torres et al., 2016). 
In Sweden, using information from the various municipalities, a value of ¤39,000 per year 
of life gained was estimated (Siverskog et al., 2019). In Australia, this value was estimated at 
A$28,000 (Edney 2018). Finally, a recent study in the United Kingdom (Lomas et al., 2019) 
estimated a marginal productivity value for the National Health System of £5,000-£15,000 
for the period 2003-2012, significantly lower than the threshold used by NICE during the 
same period.
Threshold estimation methodologies have recently been developed and have been extended 
or applied in several countries. The research group at York University in the United Kingdom 
conducted research that estimated opportunity cost thresholds for different countries, 
including Canada, India, and countries in Latin America (Claxton et al., 2015; Woods et al., 
2015; Ochalek et al., 2015; Ochalek et al., 2018; Ochalek et al., 2019). The research team at the 
Institute of Clinical and Health Effectiveness of Argentina (IECS) developed a methodology 
based on per capita health expenditure and life expectancy that it used to estimate cost-
effectiveness thresholds for 176 countries (Pichon-Riviere et al., 2017).
As we will see further on, a large part of the opportunity cost estimates made to date have 
yielded values lower than the thresholds used in practice. This implies that in many cases, 
health systems may be losing more health benefits than they actually gain by introducing 
certain health technologies.
3.3. Discussion points for Latin American countries and preliminary 
proposal of opportunity cost values for countries without their 
own estimates
Estimating opportunity cost can be challenging. On the one hand, there is no unanimously 
accepted methodology. On the other hand, most of the existing methodologies were 
developed in high-income countries and usually require a large volume of high-quality 
information from the health system, which is not always available in low- and middle-income 
countries. This section offers guidance for enabling countries to obtain a preliminary first 
estimate, or guide, on what the opportunity cost value in their health systems might be.
Table 3-1 presents the main results of a series of opportunity cost estimates made with 
different methodologies in a wide range of countries, including high-, low-, and middle-
income countries, some of them in Latin America. To improve the comparability of these 
values among countries, the opportunity cost is also presented as a fraction of GDP per 
capita and as an equivalent in health expenditure per capita.
Table 3-1 Estimates of opportunity cost in different countries: sources, ranges, 
and estimates in units of GDP and health expenditure per capita.
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In most cases, the opportunity cost estimate was below 14 health expenditures per capita. In 
terms of GDP, in a third of the cases the estimate was below 0.5 GDP per DALY or QALY, and 
in almost 80% of the cases it was less than 1 GDP per capita. Less than 4% of the countries 
had estimates of their opportunity cost above 1.5 GDP per QALY or DALY, and in all cases, 
they were below 2 GDP per capita.
Some of these estimates are based on important methodological assumptions, such as 
extrapolation of the elasticity of health expenditure from places where it was measured 
(such as the United Kingdom) to others where it was not directly measured (such as Brazil 
or Chile). Moreover, in some cases, estimates are shown for several Latin American countries 
but conducted with the same methodology (Woods et al., 2016; Ochalek et al., 2018; Pichon-
Riviere et al., 2017). These are significant limitations when analyzing this information, but to 
date, they are virtually the only opportunity cost estimates available.
What is the best estimate of the opportunity cost in health that can be made in the 
absence of specific data for a particular health system and country?
Based on the results obtained in several countries, it seems reasonable, in the absence of 
specific and precise data by country, to estimate that the opportunity cost can probably 
be found in a value ranging from 7 to 14 health expenditures per capita (central estimate 
of 10.5 health expenditures) or, translated into the GDP of the countries, from 0.5 to 1 GDP 
(central estimate of 0.75 GDP). In the case of the countries presented in Table 3-1, the cost-
opportunity estimates were within or below this range in almost 80% of them.
Because there is no consensus or clear recommendation on the advisability of extrapolating 
opportunity cost data between countries based on GDP per capita or health expenditure 
per capita, these results were extrapolated to Latin American countries using the following 
equation, which considers both factors:
Reported opportunity cost 
(currency reported in the study)
 Country data (currency 
reported in the study) 



























Lomas 2018 Canada 2013 DALY CAD 50,000 20,000 100,000 54,087 5,481 0.92 9.12
Lomas 2019 UK 2012 QALY GBP 14,411 11,182 19,861 26,935 2,246 0.54 6.42
Ochalek 2019 India 2015 DALY INR 18,196 14,116 22,275 105,117 3,782 0.17 4.81
Edney 2018 Australia 2012 QALY AUS 28,033 20,758 37,667 65,958 5,731 0.43 4.89
Claxton 2015 UK 2008 QALY GBP 12,936 2,018 29,314 23,611 1,814 0.55 7.13
Vallejo-Torres 2017 Spain 2012 QALY Euros 23,500 22,000 25,000 22,231 2,018 1.06 11.65
Woods 2016*+ Brazil 2013 DALY USD 4,969 2,393 7,544 12,300 1,259 0.4 3.95
Chile 2013 DALY USD 7,166 4,896 9,436 15,843 1,179 0.45 6.08
Colombia 2013 DALY USD 3,444 1,370 5,518 8,213 477 0.42 7.22
Mexico 2013 DALY USD 4,580 2,410 6,749 10,725 623 0.43 7.35
Peru 2013 DALY USD 2,764 1,144 4,383 6,757 333 0.41 8.30
Uruguay 2013 DALY USD 7,348 4,548 10,147 16,974 1,497 0.43 4.91
Ochalek 2018#+ Argentina 2015 DALY USD 6,203 4,936 7,469 13,789 1,206 0.45 5.14
Brazil 2015 DALY USD 7,683 6,048 9,318 8,814 1,011 0.87 7.60
Colombia 2015 DALY USD 9,263 7,067 11,459 6,176 372 1.5 24.9
Mexico 2016 DALY USD 7,227 5,723 8,730 9,606 543 0.75 13.31
Peru 2017 DALY USD 5,184 3,836 6,531 6,229 319 0.83 16.25
Pichon-Riviere 2019 &+ Argentina 2016 QALY USD 14,622 7,494 27,259 12,790 965 1.14 15.15
Brazil 2017 QALY USD 14,646 7,586 26,894 8,713 1,026 1.68 14.28
Chile 2018 QALY USD 14,288 8,128 25,197 13,748 1,173 1.04 12.19
Colombia 2019 QALY USD 5,661 2,878 10,680 5,871 347 0.96 16.31
Mexico 2020 QALY USD 6,440 3,351 11,749 8,740 478 0.74 13.47
Peru 2021 QALY USD 4,818 2,474 8,961 6,205 319 0.78 15.09
Uruguay 2022 QALY USD 13,719 7,955 23,558 15,387 1,394 0.89 9.84
Baal 2018 Netherlands 2015 QALY Euros 41,000 25,900 110,400 40,732 4,234 1.01 9.68
Siverskog 2019 Sweden 2016 QALY Euros 45,394 24,738 275,078 46,621 5,098 0.97 8.90
Edoka 2020# South Africa 2015 DALY USD 3,296 3,015 3,577 5,700 471 0.58 7.00
* The mean estimate of the threshold is calculated as the average between the upper and lower limits
# The mean estimate of the threshold is calculated as the average between the upper and lower values obtained from the different reported methods
´ + Results are shown for a selected group of Latin American countries
& Not strictly an opportunity cost estimate
where OC
US$
 is the opportunity cost estimate; HEpc is the per capita health expenditure, 
and GDPpc is the value of GPD per capita of the country or health system for which the 
opportunity cost is to be estimated; R
HEpc
 is the multiple of health expenditures per capita; 
and R
GDPpc
 is the multiple of GDPs per capita used as a reference to estimate the opportunity 
cost.
Table 3-2 shows the values, in current US$ 2016 and in fractions of GDP per capita, of 
the opportunity cost estimates for several Latin American countries, according to the 
methodology described.
Table 3-2 Estimates of the opportunity cost in different Latin American 
countries, extrapolated from the results obtained in international studies 
(US$ 2016 and, in parentheses, fraction of GDP 2016)
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Note: For the opportunity cost estimate (OCUS$) the values corresponding to GDP and health expenditure 
(GDPpc and RGDPpc) for the last available year (2016) were obtained from the World Bank (https://data.
worldbank.org). In the case of Argentina, the health expenditure values correspond to local estimates made 
by the Ministry of Finance (*). For all estimates, the RHEpc values of 10.5, 7, and 14 and RGDPpc values of 0.75, 
0.50, and 1.00 for the central estimates, lower limit and upper limit, respectively, were used
(*) Secretariat of Economic Policy, Ministry of Finance. Consolidated Expenditure 2004-2015. Available at: 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/gto_publico_consolidado_2004-2015_corrientes.xlsx. 
Accessed July 2019.
These preliminary estimates can serve as a guide for countries that do not yet have their own 
estimates of the opportunity cost threshold in their jurisdictions. As previously mentioned, 
these thresholds allow health systems to determine whether a given intervention is cost-
effective in terms of opportunity cost. For example, taking these proposed values as a 
reference, a technology with an ICER of US$ 6,000 per QALY would be cost-effective in 
Chile, as it is clearly below the estimated opportunity cost value for the country (US$ 11,000). 
On the other hand, an intervention with an ICER of US$ 9,000 per QALY would not be cost-
effective in Mexico from the standpoint of its opportunity cost, and therefore its coverage 
would imply a net loss of health benefits.
If cost-effectiveness and maximization of health benefits were the only criteria to be used 
to allocate the necessary resources, it would be easy to create a decision rule based only on 
the opportunity cost threshold: if the ICER of a certain technology or intervention is below 
the threshold, it can be included in the coverage or benefits package; if the ICER is above 
the threshold, it should not be. However, as mentioned earlier, health systems also tend to 
take other dimensions such as budgetary impact or social valuation into account, as seen 
in the next chapter. Finally, these opportunity cost estimates are made at the country level 
and could therefore be less representative or applicable in countries with fragmented health 
systems, where the opportunity cost is not homogeneous throughout the country and may 
vary in the different subsectors (see Chapter 7).
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4. DECISION-MAKING THRESHOLDS AND MODIFIERS 
Even in countries with an explicit decision rule, most decision-makers prefer to have a certain 
degree of freedom or discretion to exercise their judgment. Therefore, in many countries 
with an explicit cost-effectiveness threshold, it is presented as a range and not a single 
fixed value. In other cases, the possibility is considered that there are specific reasons for 
it to be more flexible and not adhere to that single threshold. Some countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, have different thresholds for different types of technologies or patient 
populations. We will call these aspects “modifiers” that can affect the decision-making 
process under certain circumstances. These potential modifiers are the main focus of this 
chapter.
4.1. Modifiers to the decision in the deliberative process
The term “modifiers” is used to identify the reasons for allowing alterations in the application 
of the “general” decision rule, but in a clear, transparent manner prior to the particular 
decision. For example, in Scotland, the Scottish Medicines Commission (SMC) identifies the 
following “modifiers” (Scottish Medicines Consortium 2019):
1. Evidence of a substantial increase in life expectancy (with sufficient quality of life 
to make additional survival desirable). A substantial increase in life expectancy is 
considered to be a three-month increase in median survival, beyond which the SMC 
evaluates each situation in a particular way depending on the clinical context;
2. Evidence of substantial improvement in quality of life (regardless of an increase in 
survival);
3. Evidence that a subgroup of patients can obtain an extra or specific benefit and that 
the drug in question can, in practice, specifically target this subgroup;
4. Absence of another therapeutic alternative of proven efficacy provided by the National 
Health System for the pathology in question;
5. Possibility of serving as a bridge to another definitive therapy (e.g., bone marrow 
transplantation or curative surgery) in a defined proportion of patients;
6. Emergence of a drug approved for a specific indication as an alternative to one not 
approved for that indication but used in clinical practice in Scotland’s health system 
as the only therapeutic option for it. Some examples are the injection of caffeine in the 
treatment of apnea of prematurity or betaine as adjuvant treating in homocystinuria.
Many of the modifiers used in different parts of the world are related to the dimensions of 
value mentioned in Chapter 2. For example: the treatment targets a very serious or life-
threatening condition; the treatment is for a condition that does not have an effective 
therapy (so it may be fair to offer some therapeutic alternative); the treatment represents a 
bridge until patients can obtain a more effective therapy; the treatment represents a major 
innovation, offering a substantial change in life expectancy or quality of life; if not covered, 
the treatment may put the patient or his family at financial risk.
The list of modifiers is determined by the decision-makers’ vision in each context. Surveys 
were conducted in some jurisdictions to assess the degree of support for the use of certain 
Vallejo-Torres, L., García-Lorenzo, B., & Serrano-Aguilar, P. (2017). Estimating a cost-
effectiveness threshold for the Spanish NHS. Health Economics, 27(4), 746–761. https://doi.
org/10.1002/hec.3633
Wang, S., Gum, D., & Merlin, T. (2018). Comparing the ICERs in Medicine Reimbursement 
Submissions to NICE and PBAC—Does the Presence of an Explicit Threshold Affect the ICER 
Proposed? Value in Health, 21(8), 938–943. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2018.01.017
Woods, B.S., Rothery, C., Revill, P., Hallett, T., Phillips, A. (2018). Setting research priorities in 
Global Health: appraising the value of evidence generation activities to support decision-
making in health care (CHE Research Paper; 155). York: Centre for Health Economics, 
University of York. 2018 Jun, p. 1-54. https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/132730/
38 39
modifiers (for example, Rowen et al., 2015 and Linley & Hughes, 2012 in the United Kingdom). 
Modifiers are normally applied within the framework of the deliberative decision-making 
process, which usually is essentially the discussion that takes place around clinical and cost-
effectiveness evidence.
4.2. Modifiers reflected in the use of “differential” thresholds
One way in which modifiers are used is by determining different decision-making thresholds 
for different situations. In 2009, NICE determined that for treatments considered “end-of-
life” that prolonged survival by at least three months in patients with less than two years of 
life expectancy, the committee could value earned QALYs higher than in other circumstances 
(NICE, 2009).
Since implementation of this “end-of-life” guide in the United Kingdom, the committee rated 
“end-of-life” QALYs up to 2.5 times higher than the usual QALYs. As a result, this is now 
reflected in a cost-effectiveness threshold for including these treatments that can reach 
£50,000 per QALY, rather than the usual threshold of £20,000.
Another situation in which some health systems may consider a different threshold is in the 
case of highly specialized treatments. These are often technologies for serious diseases or 
diseases with a risk of death for which there is no specific treatment, mostly ultra-orphan 
drugs for ultra-rare diseases. 
In the United Kingdom, NICE, together with the National Health System, conducted a survey 
of the population on different proposals to modify the way in which these highly specialized 
technologies were evaluated and funded. The original proposal was to increase the threshold 
for these technologies to a maximum of £100,000 per QALY (five times the usual threshold 
in the United Kingdom). After the survey, the proposal was accepted and the standard 
modified to allow the use of a cost-effectiveness threshold of £100,000 per QALY for these 
technologies, allowing it to be increased to a maximum of £300,000 per QALY depending 
on the total QALYs the technology can provide; this maximum threshold may be considered 
in exceptional cases where a technology can provide a maximum level of additional survival 
(30 QALYs or more) (NICE, 2017).
Although, as we have seen, there are health systems that accept the use of modifiers in 
certain circumstances, decision-makers must be aware that the use of cost-effectiveness 
thresholds that are higher than the opportunity cost conflicts with the objective of 
maximizing population health. For example, if we assume that the United Kingdom’s usual 
threshold (£20,000 per QALY) correctly reflects the opportunity cost, then gaining a QALY 
by funding an ultra-specialized technology at a cost of £300,000 per QALY would involve 
the loss of 15 QALYs. This is because funding the ultra-specialized technology would imply 
shifting resources from other interventions that could have yielded a greater benefit. The 
net result of financing this technology will be a loss of 14 QALYs (for every QALY gained 
by this technology, 15 QALYs are lost in the rest of the total population). The loss of QALYs 
could be even greater if the true opportunity cost in the United Kingdom is below the usual 
cost-effectiveness threshold of £20,000, as suggested by the Claxton et al. study in 2015.
Notwithstanding, it is common to find that the decision-making thresholds used by countries 
do not match their opportunity cost values. No studies, in either the United Kingdom or 
other countries, estimated values consistently lower than the opportunity cost at decision-
making thresholds. In the United Kingdom, the opportunity cost estimate was approximately 
£13,000 (Claxton et al., 2015), a value lower than the £20,000 decision-making threshold. In 
Spain, an opportunity cost of ¤22,000-¤25,000 per QALY (Vallejo-Torres et al., 2016) was 
estimated, also lower than the threshold of ¤30,000 usually used as a reference. In Sweden, 
using information from the various municipalities, a value of ¤39,000 per year of life gained 
was estimated (Siverskog et al., 2019), when the threshold commonly used in that country 
is ¤48,000. In Australia, a value of A$28,000 was estimated (Edney 2018), a substantial 
difference from the threshold of A$50,000 usually taken as a reference. Finally, a recent 
study in the United Kingdom (Lomas et al., 2019) estimated a marginal productivity value 
in the National Health System of £5,000-£15,000 for the period 2003-2012, which is also 
significantly lower than the threshold used by NICE in the same period. These differences 
show that other aspects are allowing the decision rule to be modified.
4.3. Discussion points for Latin American countries wishing to 
establish a decision-making rule for the inclusion of technologies
Countries in their early stages of formalizing the use of health technology assessment should 
consider a number of aspects when discussing how economic evidence will be taken into 
account in the decision whether to cover or include technologies in benefits packages. The 
following are some of the questions that may arise during this process:
(a) Decision-makers will need to discuss the characteristics that a decision rule might have 
in their jurisdictions and the extent to which it should be transparent and explicit. If the 
incremental cost-effectiveness of the technologies is to be used for decision-making, there 
must be an explicit definition of the threshold and the elements on which it is based. If the 
threshold is not defined in relation to the opportunity cost, the rationale for this deviation 
and its potential consequences in terms of lost health should be discussed.
(b) Decision-makers should discuss whether, given the chosen decision rule, modifiers may 
be considered that could alter its application in special circumstances.
(c) If there are modifiers considered relevant, their nature must be defined.
(d) The best way to apply these modifiers may be in a deliberative decision-making process, 
assigning a different weight to the QALY based on the situation or, what is equivalent and 
perhaps clearer, using different thresholds for different technologies or groups of diseases. 
Potential implications of the use of modifiers in decision-making
As mentioned, if the sole objective of a health system were to maximize the health of the 
population, it would only need to consider the cost-effectiveness of the interventions, and 
opportunity cost would be the only relevant threshold. However, the decision to include 
a technology whose incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) is above the opportunity 
cost may be justified for certain technologies with attributes valued by the health system 
or society (such as reducing inequity or benefitting those who are worse off). As these 
decisions imply diminishing the health of the population as a whole to the benefit of a 
particular group or groups, the limits within which these other dimensions can be considered 
should be discussed or defined.
Decision rules are precisely the tool for specifying the modifiers and the limits within which 
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they can be applied. In which cases will it be valid for the system to consider acceptable a 
decision that implies a net loss of overall health? What characteristics should the technologies 
or clinical circumstances that could justify it have? What are the relevant modifiers for society 
and how can they be applied? What margin is society willing to give decision-makers to 
deviate from what would be the most efficient allocation of resources?
The next section presents a model that could be used as a guide for countries that are in the 
process of discussing these decision rules.
4.4. Example of a decision rule and modifiers
As discussed above, countries that decide to allow modifiers need clear rules that define 
under what circumstances and within what limits they may be applied.
In this regard, an example of a decision rule and the application of modifiers are presented 
below. The example is not prescriptive, of course. It is intended to serve as a reference and 
guide when discussing a decision rule to apply with respect to economic evidence, or how 
different modifiers could be included.
This decision rule is based on (or anchored in) opportunity cost, in the sense that a given 
technology can only be considered cost-effective only if its ICER is similar to or below the 
opportunity cost threshold. However, it provides for the existence of situations in which the 
use of modifiers could be justified, which allows for a shift away from the opportunity cost 
in some cases. This implies that there will be different thresholds (expressed as multiples of 
opportunity cost per QALY) in four categories in which we will divide health interventions 
and technologies. Here we observe a possible categorization of different situations and 
modifiers.
A. Health technologies or interventions that are cost-saving or clearly cost-effective 
according to the local opportunity cost threshold.
B. Health technologies or interventions that perform well in dimensions considered 
relevant according to the local value framework and that could be covered despite 
the absence of an optimal cost-effectiveness profile.
C. Special cases of effective health technologies or interventions for serious life-
threatening diseases, which may not be cost-effective according to the local 
opportunity cost threshold.
D. Special cases of effective health technologies or interventions for serious ultra-rare 
diseases that seriously threaten life and may not be cost-effective according to the 
local opportunity cost threshold.
Figure 4-1 graphically shows the four threshold levels on the cost-effectiveness plane for 
each of the categories mentioned. As can be seen, category A technologies are virtually the 
only ones with an ICER clearly below the opportunity cost threshold and therefore the only 
ones that can be considered cost-effective from this standpoint. The technologies in the 
other three categories (B, C, and D) have an ICER equal to or greater than the opportunity 
cost value of the health system, so their coverage or inclusion in the benefits package could 
imply a net loss of health benefits. It is important to note that the further technologies are 
from the opportunity cost threshold (D rather than C, and C rather than B), the greater the 
overall loss of health benefits to the benefit of some favored groups (or loss of efficiency). 
In the decision rule we indicate here, these lost benefits could be justified in certain cases 
by gains in other dimensions considered important, as discussed below. 
Figure 4-1 Different cost-effectiveness thresholds of decision making and 
their relationship with the opportunity cost threshold, by health technology 
category.
Table 4-1 summarizes the decision rule to determine whether the cost-effectiveness of 
a health technology can be considered acceptable within each category. The ranges of 
values are estimated as multiples of the opportunity cost. For example, as seen in the table, 
according to this decision rule, a technology in category C could be considered cost-effective 
if its ICER is below 2.5x the opportunity cost.
Table 4-1 Ranges in which the cost-effectiveness of a healthcare technology 




We will now describe the different categories in greater detail and provide examples. For 
simplicity’s sake, we will assume that the country has already determined the criteria or 
dimensions of value considered relevant based on the health system’s objectives and other 
underlying social values (see Chapter 2). For example, let us assume that a country has 
defined the following elements as part of its value framework: magnitude and relevance of 
clinical benefit (effectiveness); quality of the evidence; cost-effectiveness; budgetary impact; 
impact on equity; impact on public health; severity of the disease; absence of therapeutic 
alternatives; and costs to patients and their family.
When evaluating the inclusion of a technology, the health system considers all these 
dimensions. When we say a technology performs well in relevant dimensions according 
to the local value framework, it means that these dimensions were evaluated and that the 
technology’s performance was considered acceptable.
A - Health technologies or interventions that are cost-saving or are clearly cost-effective 
according to the local opportunity cost threshold.
As effective and clearly cost-effective technologies, Category A technologies should be 
included without delay. Their coverage or inclusion in the benefits package will represent 
a net health gain: from the standpoint of maximizing health benefits, their inclusion is the 
right decision.
However, health systems may consider other dimensions that could justify not covering 
a cost-effective health technology or intervention. An extremely negative performance in 
some dimension, such as an extremely high budgetary impact that threatens sustainability, 
an increase in inequity, or a technology considered of low social value is reasonable cause 
for not covering effective and cost-effective technologies. 
When released on the market, the HPV vaccine for the prevention of cervical cancer was 
priced several times higher than it is today. Although it was considered a potentially very 
effective and cost-effective intervention, many countries refused to cover it because of the 
enormous budgetary impact it could entail. In some countries, the cost of covering this 
single vaccine was determined to be almost equivalent to the cost of the entire vaccination 
program that the countries were offering at the time. Once the price of the vaccine was 
significantly lower, more countries began to include it in their coverage; nonetheless, it is a 
good example of the importance of budgetary impact in decision-making. The new hepatitis 
C drugs also put health systems around the world in a similar situation, in some cases refusing 
or delaying their coverage due to the high budgetary impact they represented, despite 
being considered effective and cost-effective. 
Another justifiable rationale for non-coverage of technologies in this category is a negative 
impact on equity. In Thailand, it was determined that the use of dental implants instead 
of removable dentures could be an effective and cost-effective intervention for improving 
quality of life. However, a large proportion of the country’s population still lacked access to 
that standard of care. This was especially true in the rural populations with less access to 
the health system. It was determined that expanding coverage to include dental implants 
could increase inequality, since it would be mainly the urban population that would end up 
accessing this service, when large swaths of the population would continue without access 
to more basic care. It would therefore be inappropriate to include dental implants until 
broader coverage of more basic interventions for the entire population had been achieved. 
Expanding the coverage of low- or medium-priority services before there is near-universal 
coverage of high-priority services is considered an ethically unacceptable concession that 
health systems should not make (WHO 2014).
Finally, the coverage of medications for erectile dysfunction (i.e., sildenafil), surgery for 
tattoo removal, or other cosmetic surgeries are examples of interventions that can be cost-
effective but that many health systems around the world decide not to include in their 
coverage because they consider them to be of low social value.
In summary, category A includes technologies that have proven to be cost-saving or clearly 
cost-effective according to the local opportunity cost threshold. That is, there is high certainty 
that their ICER is less than the opportunity cost for that health system (that is why the ICER 
must be equal to or less than 0.75 of the opportunity cost). With these technologies, the 
course to follow should be to include them without delay, and the analysis should focus only 
on ruling out clear reasons why they should not be covered. Simply put, the decision rule 
would say: it is included in the coverage, unless there are clear reasons to the contrary. 
B - Health technologies or interventions that perform well in dimensions considered 
relevant according to the local value framework and that could be covered despite lack 
of an optimal cost-effectiveness profile
Category B includes health technologies or interventions that offer significant benefits in 
clinical outcomes considered relevant, such as improvement in survival or quality of life, 
and that also perform well in other dimensions of the local value framework. One example 
could be an effective intervention or technology that is expected to have a positive impact 
on equity, is aligned with national health priorities, and for which there is little uncertainty 
when estimating its health benefits and incremental cost-effectiveness ratio. In these cases, 
coverage within certain limits could be considered, despite the lack of an optimal cost-
effectiveness profile.
As discussed above, it is not uncommon for countries to accept a threshold above the 
opportunity cost, so in this guide we propose as a reasonable limit for this category that the 
ICER be within a maximum of 1.5x the estimated opportunity cost for that health system.
The technology’s performance in the dimensions assessed according to the local value 
framework will determine the extent to which its coverage can be considered acceptable 
despite having an ICER that is higher than the opportunity cost of the health system. The 
better its performance, the greater the likelihood it will be accepted with an ICER at the 
top end of this category (1.5x the opportunity cost). This means that the fact that a health 
technology has an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio within the range of this category is 
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for it to be considered for coverage.
C – Special cases of effective health technologies or interventions for severe life-
threatening diseases that may not be cost-effective according to the local opportunity 
cost threshold
Category C includes effective health technologies or interventions for serious life--threatening 
diseases (i.e., with a life expectancy of less than two years). Within certain limits, these 
technologies could be covered in special cases, despite not being cost-effective according 
to the local opportunity cost threshold, if the following conditions are met: 
• They perform well in dimensions considered important according to the local value 
framework
44 45
• There is reasonable certainty that the new technology can offer a substantial 
improvement in terms of improved life expectancy (with sufficient quality of life to 
make this extension desirable) or quality of life. For example, a lower boundary of 
the confidence interval for estimating improvement in overall survival of at least 0.25 
years of life or its equivalent in QALYs; or the intervention is a necessary bridge to 
another effective treatment. 
• It affects a small population and does not represent a high budgetary impact
• There are no other therapeutic alternatives
The degree of clinical benefit and performance of the technology in the dimensions evaluated 
will determine the extent to which its cost-effectiveness is considered acceptable within the 
threshold range for this category. Based on the decision rules that other countries apply in 
these cases, in this guide we propose as a reasonable ceiling for this category that the ICER 
be a maximum of 2.5x the estimated opportunity cost for that health system. As mentioned 
earlier, this category includes effective treatments for severe life-threatening diseases but 
could also include treatments for other illnesses considered a priority by society in each 
country.
D – Special cases of effective health technologies or interventions for severe ultra-rare, 
serious life-threatening diseases that may not be cost-effective according to the local 
opportunity cost threshold
• They perform well in dimensions considered relevant according to the value framework
• There is reasonable certainty that the new technology can offer a substantial benefit in 
terms of improved life expectancy (with sufficient quality of life to make this extension 
desirable) or quality of life. For example, a lower boundary of the confidence interval 
for estimating the improvement in overall survival of at least 0.5 years of life or its 
equivalent in QALYs. 
• It affects a small population and does not represent a high budgetary impact
• There are no other therapeutic alternatives
The degree of clinical benefit and performance of the technology in the dimensions evaluated 
will determine the extent to which its cost-effectiveness is considered acceptable within the 
threshold range for this category. According to the decision rules that other countries apply 
in these cases, in this guide we propose 5x the estimated opportunity cost for the health 
system as a maximum ceiling for this category. This is a very special category, which can 
involve very different health conditions and technologies, and therefore, a wide range is 
being proposed. 
However, the upper limit of this range (5x the opportunity cost) would only be acceptable 
for technologies that offer maximum health benefit to patients (i.e., more than 10 QALYs).
4.5. Application in Latin American countries
Table 4-2 presents the estimate of the threshold or upper limit for considering the cost-
effectiveness of a health technology acceptable in each category in several Latin American 
countries. Values were obtained from each country’s opportunity cost estimates (Chapter 
3) and the proposed decision rule for each category as multiples of the opportunity cost 
(Table 4-1).
Table 4-2 Threshold or upper limit for considering the cost-effectiveness 
of a health technology acceptable in each category (in US$ 2016 and as a 
fraction of GDP)
Note: Estimates are based on the opportunity cost for each country (central estimate, lower and upper 
boundary) described in Chapter 3.
46 47
4.6. Final remarks
Application of the decision rule presented here requires that health systems have a defined 
value framework and that technologies be evaluated according to this framework, since 
decisions are not based solely on their cost-effectiveness. The fact that a healthcare 
technology presents an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio within the range of a given 
category does not mean that it must necessarily be included in the benefits package and 
financed. 
For example, a new cancer drug that offers unimportant clinical benefits or for which the 
cost-effectiveness estimate is uncertain or there are doubts about the quality of the evidence 
may not be covered despite having an ICER within the established maximum for health 
technologies for serious life-threatening diseases (Category C). This implies that there will 
be a ranking in each category, so that not all technologies in a given category can aspire to 
be covered with an ICER at the upper end of this range. This higher end would be acceptable 
only for technologies whose performance in other dimensions of the value framework is 
deemed good enough to justify their inclusion.
Expressing cost-effectiveness ranges as multiples of opportunity cost makes these potentially 
controversial and costly decisions more explicit in terms of population health and enables 
the benefits lost to each decision to be quantified (Sculpher 2016). Table 4-3 shows what 
benefits could be obtained, what benefits would be lost, and the net benefit of covering or 
including a technology whose ICER is at the upper limit of each category in the benefits 
package. For example, when deciding to finance a new technology at the upper limit of 
category C (2.5x the opportunity cost), for each unit of benefit obtained thanks to the new 
technology, the health system will be losing the possibility of obtaining 2.5 units of profit 
through other technologies or interventions, for a net loss of 1.5 units. 
Table 4-3 Benefits obtained, benefits lost, and net benefits from covering 
technologies at the upper limit of each category
Clearly defined decision-making rules and modifiers provide a framework for making these 
difficult decisions and contribute to health resource allocation that more appropriately 
reflects a society’s values and priorities.
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5. BUDGETARY IMPACT AND AFFORDABILITY 
THRESHOLD
As mentioned, clinical benefit and cost-effectiveness are often the most important aspects 
when conducting health technology assessment, but many agencies also conduct budgetary 
impact assessment studies, which is one of the dimensions frequently included in value 
frameworks. (See Chapters 2 and 4). When a group of HTA agencies, health decision-makers, 
and technology manufacturers from Latin America discussed what the most important 
dimensions of the value frameworks should be, budgetary impact was considered one of 
the seven basic elements that should not be omitted. (Pichon-Riviere et al., 2019).
There are two important reasons for this. The first is that it is usually necessary to plan the 
budget to make room for the additional expense that the new technology will entail and 
thereby ensure that it is adopted in an orderly manner. The second is that beyond being 
cost-effective, some technologies can create certain additional affordability issues if they 
represent a high budgetary impact, especially when the health budget cannot be increased 
in the short term. In these cases, the opportunity cost produced by the technologies that 
will be displaced to make way for the new technology could be even higher than usual. This 
is because including a technology with a high budgetary impact in coverage could affect 
many services and jeopardize their financing.
This chapter will discuss some of the issues related to budgetary impact assessment and 
how to deal with affordability aspects in the technology onboarding process. It will also 
propose a guide for determining the value for considering a technology to have a high 
budgetary impact on each health system.
5.1. Addressing aspects of affordability
Direct-acting antivirals (DAAs) for the treatment of hepatitis C were recently a challenge 
for the health technology assessment system in the United Kingdom, as they were in many 
other countries. NICE approved their use in some subgroups of patients based on their 
cost-effectiveness, but it created major affordability issues for the health system due to the 
large population of affected patients. Because of this, the English health system delayed 
adoption of the new regulations while competitively tendering the purchase of DAAs in an 
effort to lower their price. Similar situations will certainly arise in the future. For example, the 
emergence of immunotherapies for cancer is transforming terminal illnesses into chronic 
illnesses; gene therapies or new CAR-T immunotherapies may involve large short-term 
budgetary outlays rather than spreading them over the lives of these patients. Another 
controversial aspect related to the evaluation of technologies such as immunotherapy and 
gene therapies is that both the cost and long-term benefits are uncertain (Drummond et al., 
2019). 
In these situations, it may be appropriate to enter into risk-sharing agreements based on 
clinical benefit (Garrison et al., 2013). The design of such agreements, as, for example, in 
the reform of the Cancer Drugs Fund in the United Kingdom, can be informed by health 
technology assessment and may be more necessary when it comes to technologies with a 
high budgetary impact.
After the experience with antivirals for hepatitis C, the United Kingdom introduced a 
new standard to deal with technologies that could have a high budgetary impact on the 
health system. This standard makes it mandatory for conversations to be held between the 
manufacturer and the health system for technologies whose budgetary impact is expected 
to exceed £20 million per year in the first three years of their adoption. This conversation 
addresses issues related to pricing, affordability, and payment mechanisms to determine 
the best conditions for allowing its adoption. This does not mean that the United Kingdom 
will not allocate more than £20 million per year for the inclusion of a new technology, but 
it does mean that additional aspects or special payment mechanisms that allow it should 
be considered. If no agreement is reached, it may mean that the adoption of the new 
technology will be delayed beyond the usual time in order to cope with the associated 
budgetary impact. This evaluation is conducted by NICE on a case-by-case basis, fostering 
conversation between the various stakeholders. These commercial arrangements must be 
finalized by the time NICE issues the regulations for the technology in question.
Another type of trade arrangement, which was implemented in other European countries, 
was to relate the price of the product to the volume of its use. In Germany, social security 
authorized the use of DAAs for a wider range of patients on the condition that manufacturers 
lowered their price. France reached a similar agreement, in which a lower price was obtained 
if a certain number of doses were procured. In Australia, the government set a budget 
ceiling for DAAs.
In the United States, the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER) includes budgetary 
impact among its considerations of the “value of a technology” (ICER, 2019). The Institute’s 
approach takes it into account that the increase in the annual budget allocated to new 
technologies is limited because private financiers must adapt their coverage to their available 
budgets. The ICER therefore argues that these short-term budgetary impact considerations 
should be borne in mind when assessing long-term cost-effectiveness and may sometimes 
require price negotiation.
Another approach proposed by Lomas et al. for taking these aspects of affordability 
into account is to consider a lower (more demanding) cost-effectiveness threshold for 
technologies with a high budgetary impact (Lomas 2018). This argument is based on the 
fact that the opportunity cost of these technologies is probably not adequately captured at 
the “usual” threshold due to the large number of technologies that could be displaced.
The indirect financial impact can also be significant. For example, the budgetary impact of 
including a new cancer drug is generally limited to the cost of procuring it. If the technology 
is a device, other costs may be involved, such as training or investment in facilities. This is 
sometimes known as organizational impact and is an increasingly important branch of health 
technology assessment. Something similar can happen when integrating new practices 
into existing programs, such as screening or vaccines. A full health technology assessment 
should consider these costs, which are sometimes not as clear or easy to anticipate.
5.2. Discussion points for Latin American countries
The following are some of the questions that may arise when determining how to take the 
evidence on the budgetary impact of interventions into account.
(a) How can the budgetary impact assessment be integrated with the assessment of clinical 
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benefit and cost-effectiveness as a further component of the HTA process?
(b) When considering the per capita health expenditure of Latin American countries in 
relation to other countries, could a budgetary impact threshold be used as an additional 
criterion when deciding on the inclusion of technologies?
(c) Should special regulations or agreements be implemented for technologies with high 
budgetary impact? These regulations could include: establishing a link between the price 
paid for the technology and the volume used; establishing special contractual arrangements 
if there are other products that could be competitive; installment payments over longer 
periods of time for a given technology; requiring that the technology have a better cost-
effectiveness profile than the technologies approved by HTA agency’s standard procedures; 
developing performance-based risk-sharing arrangements when the long-term costs and/or 
benefits of the technology are uncertain.
5.3. When can we say that a technology has a high budgetary 
impact? Preliminary proposal for a baseline budgetary impact 
threshold for countries and health systems that have not made 
their own estimates
Ideally, to determine whether a technology has a high budgetary impact, we should have an 
affordability threshold that allows us to establish a rule. However, in the case of budgetary 
impact, there is no consensus on the theoretical basis for establishing this limit. This has not 
prevented countries from setting values for considering the budgetary impact to be high, 
and technologies that exceed this limit are subject to additional regulations or requirements.
To propose a guide for the countries of Latin America, it is worth briefly reviewing some 
international experiences that can be extrapolated to the reality of the region.
International estimates of what is considered high budgetary impact
In England, NICE assesses the financial impact of the introduction of a technology in the 
first three years. If it exceeds a threshold of £20 million in any of these three years, the 
health system considers it to have a high budgetary impact. This may involve taking action 
to mitigate the impact on the health system (NICE Budgetary impact test). This action can 
include negotiating with the manufacturer of the technology to improve its accessibility, 
delaying the introduction of the technology, or gradually introducing the technology in 
different subgroups of patients or indications.
In France, the health system defines a significant budgetary impact as a value of EUR 20 
million or more in the second year of a technology’s availability or an equivalent impact in 
terms of organizational impact. (Antoñanzas et al., 2017)
In Germany, rapid access will be permitted for drugs with an annual budgetary impact of 
less than ¤1 million, with the added benefit of not being subject to price controls. If a drug 
for an orphan disease will have an annual budgetary impact of less than ¤50 million, it may 
be included through a more direct process with lower requirements, although it must go 
through the price negotiation process (Antoñanzas et al., 2017). This policy implies that 
¤50 million per year is considered a significant budgetary impact that requires additional 
mechanisms before allowing the coverage of a technology.
In Australia, the inclusion of medicines with an annual budgetary impact of more than 
A$5 million requires a special authorization procedure involving the Ministry of Economy. 
When the impact is expected to exceed A$10 million in any of the first four years of use, 
authorization from the federal government’s entire cabinet is required. Different studies 
estimated that the probability of a drug being covered and included in the benefits package 
in Australia could fall by up to half if the budgetary impact is higher than the threshold of 
A$10 million (Chim et al., 2010; Harris et al., 2008; Mauskopf et al., 2012).
In the United States, ICER developed a methodology for defining high budgetary impact on 
medicines. If a single molecule implies an annual expenditure of more than US$904 million 
at the national level, it is considered to have a high budgetary impact (ICER, 2019). This 
value arises from assuming that that health expenditure is expected to increase by a certain 
value (1%) above expected GDP growth (2.75%) and that 13.3% of total health expenditure 
corresponds to medicines. From these values, and knowing what the total health expenditure 
is, the total amount that the budget for new medicines could grow each year is estimated. 
The average of this increase in expenditure, which could correspond to each new molecule, 
is estimated from the number of new molecules that become available each year (34 in 
2016). Any drug whose budgetary impact involves doubling this average value is considered 
to have a high budgetary impact.
In 2015, Canada developed a mechanism for prioritizing which technologies should be 
evaluated by the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH). This 
prioritization considers a series of attributes and dimensions of the candidate technologies, 
such as potential clinical benefit, potential population impact, and equity aspects. In the 
economic dimension, a budgetary impact of Can$50 million (CADTH, 2015) is defined as 
significant impact.
Preliminary estimate of a budgetary impact threshold for jurisdictions without their own 
estimates
As has been shown, countries express the threshold for determining high budgetary impact 
as a net value at the national level. This value cannot be compared or transferred directly to 
other jurisdictions, as it depends on factors such as population size and health expenditure. 
Even with the same health system and per capita health expenditure, two countries with 
different populations may not have the same budgetary impact threshold in net terms. 
It would be unreasonable to expect two countries with a similar number of inhabitants 
(e.g., Colombia and England) to have the same budgetary impact threshold if their health 
expenditure is very different (US$340 vs US$4,000). Therefore, in order to obtain comparable 
values, it is preferable to express the budgetary impact threshold as a fraction of health 
expenditure, calculated as follows:







 are the budgetary impact threshold, total population, and health 
expenditure per capita.
Table 5-1 presents reference values for high budgetary impact used by the countries described 
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above. The values are expressed as the net value used by the country at the national level, 
in local currency and as a fraction of health expenditure. As an example, this table also 
presents the equivalents of each of these high-budgetary impact thresholds transferred 
to Argentina. To adapt the definitions of high budgetary impact from one jurisdiction to 
another, the following equation was used:
where AT
Local 







 are the estimate of budgetary impact, total population, 




 are the 
population and health expenditure per capita of the country to which the estimate is to be 
transferred.
Table 5-1 High budgetary impact threshold in selected countries
England’s high budgetary impact threshold of £20 million is equivalent to 0.00016 of the 
country’s total health expenditure. If a country like Argentina decided to adopt a similar 
threshold, obviously it would not be able to directly use the value of £20 million, as its 
population and health expenditure are different. Translating this value with the methodology 
explained above, the equivalent threshold for Argentina would be approximately 
US$8.7million, a value that represents a fraction of health expenditure similar to that of the 
country of comparison.
The table shows that countries use different definitions and values and that there is no 
consensus on the methodology for defining high budgetary impact: what should then be the 
threshold to define it? Beyond variability, it seems reasonable to assume that it is between 
0.00008 and 0.00024 units of health expenditure, with a central estimate of 0.00016 units. 
Based on this estimate, Table 5-2 presents the high budgetary impact threshold values for 
the country’s total, and per million inhabitants, for a number of Latin American countries (in 
2016 current US$ dollars).
As a reference, the table also presents what it means in each country to cover or include 
a technology with a high budgetary impact in the benefits package in terms of additional 
population that could be covered with those same funds. How to interpret this indicator of 
equivalence between high budgetary impact and additional inhabitants who could receive 
coverage? In a population of 1,000,000, covering a new technology with a budgetary impact 
of 0.00016 units of health expenditure represents a budgetary impact equivalent to 160 
health expenditures per capita. That is, with the cost of including the new technology in the 
benefits package, 160 additional people could be covered for all their health expenses; in 
other words, to finance this new technology, the health system would need 160 additional 
people to make the average contribution to the health budget but not have any consumption. 
In the case of Argentina, with a population of 44 million, this means that with the resources 
that would need to be allocated to cover a new technology with a high budgetary impact, 
more than 7,000 additional people could receive health coverage (see Table 5-2- with results 
for all countries).
Table 5-2 Estimates of the high budgetary impact threshold for different 
Latin American countries (in constant 2016 US dollars), expressed as total 
net value at the country level, per million inhabitants and as equivalent in 
number of additional inhabitants who could receive coverage. 
Note: For estimation of the budgetary impact threshold (ATLocal), the values corresponding to population and 
health expenditure (PopLocal and HEpcLocal) were obtained from the World Bank (https://data.worldbank.
org) for the last available year (2016). For Argentina, the values for health expenditure correspond to local 
estimates made by the Ministry of Finance (*). For all estimates, the values of 0.00016. 0.,00008 and 0.00024 
units of health expenditure per capita per population covered were used for the central estimates, lower limit 
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and upper limit, respectively.




There is no consensus on a uniform definition of high budgetary impact or how to estimate 
it. Different countries adopt different definitions, and the implications of exceeding the 
budgetary impact threshold are different in different systems.
A high budgetary impact is not necessarily a reason not to include a technology in a benefits 
package, although it may become a reason to reconsider its inclusion, restrict its use to 
certain subgroups of patients, delay its inclusion or do so in a staggered manner, seek 
more demanding pricing agreements, extend payments for longer periods, enter into risk-
sharing arrangements, or require higher levels of authorization. A high budgetary impact 
may require consideration of an even more demanding cost-effectiveness threshold (Lomas 
et al., 2018; Lomas, 2019). On the other hand, the ethical implications of these decisions 
continue to be a source of discussion (Rumbold et al., 2019).
In low- and middle-income countries, it may be even more important to identify technologies 
that could have a high budgetary impact and take appropriate action. Indeed, the implications 
of covering or including these technologies could be even more negative in terms of 
opportunity cost than in high-income countries. Low- and middle-income countries tend to 
have less elasticity in budget management because a large part of their budgets is anchored 
to the payment of salaries or infrastructure maintenance. In addition, fragmentation of the 
health system can pose an additional problem, since provinces or small states, or social 
security institutions with relatively few beneficiaries are exposed to a greater risk from high-
cost technologies that can jeopardize their sustainability.
Lastly, the final budgetary impact of all additions made to the coverage or benefits package 
must also be taken into account. The isolated impact of a single technology may not be so 
significant, but the sum of all the additions could be. Decisions should consider the limits of 
what the health system is in a position to handle.
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6. USING ECONOMIC EVIDENCE FROM OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS
Health technology assessments used to inform resource allocation require key information 
and data elements, many of which may not be available locally. This chapter discusses the 
use of HTAs from other jurisdictions to focus on economic evidence.
6.1. Key elements of the data to be used
In an analysis of 27 international methodological guides to economic evaluations, Barbieri 
et al. (2010) examine the key data needed in HTA and the extent to which the data are 
transferable between jurisdictions, including with regard to clinical clairvoyance, evidence on 
the use of health system resources, data on health resources, and health status assessments, 
preferences, or utilities.
The clinical evidence used in HTAs consists of two main components: the relative effect 
of the treatment/technology compared to a relevant alternative; and baseline risk of the 
disease. The parameters are generally considered independent of one another. Data on the 
relative effects of treatment typically come from randomized clinical trials or systematic 
reviews of clinical trials; in most methodological guidelines, these data were considered 
transferable between jurisdictions. Although it would be ideal to have clinical efficacy 
data from the jurisdiction itself, in practical terms it is generally impossible to conduct a 
clinical trial by jurisdiction. However, some of the existing trials may have recruited patients 
from the jurisdiction in question, or from one with a similar health care system or level of 
development, and this information could be considered in the HTA. If the technology in 
question has been used in the jurisdiction itself, even in a limited fashion, it could be verified 
whether the clinical outcomes obtained from regular clinical use (real-world evidence) are 
similar to those of international clinical trials, which are conducted predominantly in high-
income countries under more controlled conditions.
Baseline risk (e.g., prevalence or incidence of the health problem or outcome of interest) 
is more likely to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so it is generally necessary to collect 
and include epidemiological data from the jurisdiction itself. In fact, in countries without 
good epidemiological data, one of the first steps to strengthen HTA is to improve local 
epidemiological data.
The use of resources in health care is driven by clinical practice patterns, which may differ 
both within and between jurisdictions. In many Latin American countries, they may be 
different even within the same jurisdiction, given the fragmentation of the health system in 
the public, social security, and private sectors (see Chapter 7.) When conducting an HTA, it 
is important to understand the local practice patterns relevant to the assessor; this is usually 
achieved with the participation of doctors or other professionals from the jurisdiction in the 
team performing the HTA. Observational studies or local surveys may also be necessary. In a 
survey of HTA agencies in middle-income countries, the fact that most HTAs are conducted 
in high-income countries was considered a major barrier to their transferability. One of the 
main reasons was that local clinical practice patterns differed substantially (Drummond et 
al., 2015). Transferability is also complicated by comparing the new technology with another 
technology that is no longer used or unavailable in middle-income countries. Although the 
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latter fact could also limit the usefulness of clinical evidence, today it is possible to make 
indirect comparisons using meta-network analysis (Hoaglin et al., 2011).
International methodological guidelines significantly agreed on costs: HTAs should use 
local unit costs for relevant health resources. When establishing an HTA agency or system, 
another priority is to have reliable health system cost data, which often requires an initial 
investment.
Health status assessments, preferences, or utilities are important if local analyses estimate 
the incremental cost per year of healthy living (either QALY or DALY). When using DALYs, 
an established value for disability from 234 different health statuses (disability weights) is 
available; these are “universal” values that come from an international survey in which high-, 
middle- and low-income countries participated (Salomon et al., 2012). Thus, estimating the 
incremental cost of a new technology by DALY is usually possible without having to rely on 
local values or preferences. If results are reported in QALYs, many low- and middle-income 
countries have studies assessing local social preferences using a generic instrument such as 
the EuroQol EQ-5D. If a value set for one’s own jurisdiction is not available, one for a similar 
neighboring country could be used. 
6.2. Interpretation and use of HTAs conducted in other jurisdictions
Although the goal should be to conduct HTAs locally, sometimes it may not be possible. In 
these suboptimal situations, which are common in many countries, the focus could be on 
seeing what can be learned from HTAs conducted elsewhere.  If the plan is to conduct a 
local HTA, much can be learned from a review of existing studies from other jurisdictions.
There are several resources to assess the transferability of HTAs (Goeree et al., 2010). One of 
the most important is the HTA adaptation tool of EUNEHTA, European HTA Network (www.
eunethta.eu) or “EUNetHTA HTA Adaptation Toolkit”. Ways to use existing HTA studies (and 
more specifically, economic evaluation) are also discussed in Drummond et al. (2015). It 
almost never makes sense to apply the result of an existing study directly in the jurisdiction 
itself, but it is possible to learn a great deal about the particular problems associated with 
the adoption of the technology in question and the methodological or practical problems 
in conducting an economic evaluation. There may also be elements of data from an existing 
study that could be used in the jurisdiction itself.
A few years ago, the Ministry of Health of Chile adapted economic evidence to the local 
context. To assess the degree of transferability of a number of studies, it used nine specific 
transferability criteria (Welte et al., 2004): study perspective, discount rate, approach to 
medical costs, absolute and relative prices in health care, variability of clinical practice, 
incidence and prevalence, case mix, life expectancy, and inclusion of productivity costs 
and lost work time. Each criterion was compared with the reference case for economic 
evaluations in Chile and, according to the degree of agreement, a score was assigned to 
each criterion, with a maximum score of 12 points. Studies that obtained a score of 10-12 
were considered highly transferable (Ministry of Health of Chile, 2016). Methodologies of 
this type permit the use of economic evidence data not generated in the jurisdiction itself.
6.3. Abbreviated “rapid screening” process for low- and middle-
income countries
Given the wide range of HTAs conducted around the world, it would be useful to develop 
some “speedy sifting” approaches that can help a Latin American or other middle- or low-
income countries identify the existing and available HTA reports that are most relevant, 
whose results may be more informative. The following quick screening questions may serve 
as a guide.
• Are the health policy and research questions addressed relevant to the questions in 
your jurisdiction?
• In what language is the report? Is it feasible to translate it?
• Is there an adequate description of the technology being evaluated?
• Is the scope or focus of the evaluation clearly specified?
• Has the report been subject to an external review?
• Is there a conflict of interest?
• When was the evaluation conducted? Is it already outdated for its purpose in your 
jurisdiction?
• Have the methods used in the HTA report been adequately described?
• Was the study conducted in a country with a level of wealth or health expenditure (GDP 
per capita/health expenditure per capita) similar to that of your jurisdiction? If so, can 
the results and/or recommendations be considered relevant for the jurisdiction, either 
(i) as presented, or (ii) with a basic cost-pricing adaptation or practice patterns?
• Was the study conducted in a country with a higher level of wealth or health expenditure 
(GDP per capita/health expenditure per capita) than in your jurisdiction? If so:
 » for studies with negative results/recommendations, can we automatically assume 
that the they could apply to your jurisdiction? (If the technology was not considered 
cost-effective in a higher-income country, it would probably not be cost-effective 
in yours)
 » for studies with positive results/recommendations, can you also automatically 
assume a negative result/recommendation for your jurisdiction, unless the 
estimated ICER is less than, say, 2x the opportunity cost in your healthcare system? 
For drugs or devices where the ICER is usually very sensitive to the cost of procuring 
the technology, this criterion would imply that it is not worth conducting a local 
economic assessment unless the manufacturer of the technology is willing to offer 
a significant discount (i.e., 50% or more) on the usual price of the technology in the 
high-income country where the HTA was conducted.
6.4. Discussion points for Latin American countries
Countries considering incorporating economic evidence into their decision-making process 
should consider the following:
• Are the epidemiological and cost data needed to conduct local economic assessments 
available, and if not, should investments be made to ensure their availability?
• Are there sufficient human resources with the necessary skills to conduct, adapt, and/
or interpret economic assessments, and if not, should these capacities be developed 
at the local level?
• Are there international or regional networks that can be used or created to coordinate 
and facilitate regional and international collaborative activities in the conduct of 
economic assessments?
Ideally, countries should be able to move forward by creating the necessary capacities and 
conditions to have all the elements required for correct decision-making. However, the reality 
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is that HTA agencies must often issue recommendations on interventions or technologies for 
which all the necessary information cannot be obtained. This situation is even more common 
in low- and middle-income countries that do not have the HTA structures or resources to 
evaluate all interventions or to evaluate all dimensions considered relevant for decision-
making. This is particularly true in the economic dimension since, unlike other aspects such 
as clinical benefit or quality of evidence, assessment of the economic dimension is more 
context-specific and usually requires a greater intensity of analysis and local data. Even in 
countries where the necessary technical resources are available, there may be situations in 
which decisions must be made on a large number of technologies in a short period of time, 
limiting the ability to conduct full assessments of the economic dimension of all of them. 
(Teerawattananon et al., 2017)
Economic evaluations in most Latin American countries are not comprehensively and 
systematically conducted for all technologies for which a decision with regard to their 
coverage or inclusion in the benefits package must be made. 
This is a major constraint since, as we have seen, evidence of cost-effectiveness is one of the 
key elements. It is common in Latin America for health systems to make coverage decisions 
without the ability to evaluate this dimension with a local economic evaluation (Pichon-
Riviere et al., 2019). In this scenario, data or studies from other jurisdictions can provide 
relevant information.
Let’s look at the following example of a middle-income country with a GDP per capita of 
US$8,000 and per capita health expenditure of US$600. This country must decide whether 
to include a new treatment, whose cost per patient is US$20,000, in its benefits package. 
There is no information on its cost-effectiveness at the local level, but cost-effectiveness 
is considered an important dimension that we would like to take into account. Suppose 
that this treatment has already been evaluated in a high-income country with a GDP and 
health expenditure per capita of US$40,000 and US$3,500, respectively, and the decision 
was made not to include it in the coverage package because it was not considered cost-
effective. The cost of the new treatment is similar in both countries. Unless there are more 
particular epidemiological or health system situations, at the same price it is highly unlikely 
that a technology that is not cost-effective in a high-income country will be cost-effective 
in a lower-income country. If it is important for your country to take the economic evidence 
into account, given the strong indications about the low probability that it will be cost-
effective in your country, it would be reasonable to take this information into account. In the 
next section we discuss how this type of information could be systematized for use when it 
is neither possible nor feasible to conduct a local economic assessment.
6.5. Preliminary proposal for a provisional or temporary approach 
to estimate the likelihood that a technology will be cost-effective 
in the absence of local economic assessments.
The following approach is based on the methodology developed by the Institute of Clinical 
and Sanitary Effectiveness of Argentina (IECS; Alcaraz et al., 2017), which is still in the pilot 
stage and validation process. This methodology evaluates three dimensions, and based on 
the results of each, assigns a probability that the technology will be cost-effective at the local 
level through a deliberative process. Some of the dimensions are looked at more objectively, 
and others require a more evaluative component. The three dimensions evaluated are:
1. Analysis of the technology’s coverage or inclusion in benefits packages of other 
countries
2. Crude extrapolation of cost-effectiveness obtained in economic assessments of other 
jurisdictions
3. Estimation of a “restricted cost-effect ratio” based on the clinical benefit and cost of 
the technology
These three dimensions cannot necessarily be evaluated for all technologies. This will depend, 
above all, on the information available and accessible. The result of each dimension evaluated 
will indicate whether evidence from other jurisdictions indicates that the probability that the 
technology can be considered cost-effective in your environment is very low, low, moderate, 
or high (see Table 6-1).
Table 6-1 Probability that the technology is cost-effective in the local 
context (for this particular indication in this group of patients).  Example of 
a hypothetical case.
The sections below describe how to evaluate each of these dimensions and suggest how to 
integrate each of them into a summary judgment.
Analysis of coverage or inclusion of technology in the benefits packages of other countries 
The probability that the technology or intervention will be considered cost-effective in your 
environment based on analysis of the coverage of other countries will be categorized as 
very low, low, moderate, or high (or will be considered uncertain) according to the following 
parameters:
a. Very low: It is not explicitly covered for the indications evaluated (or was not considered 
cost-effective*) in three or more countries with higher GDP, and there is no indication 
that the price of the technology, adjusted for health expenditure per capita, is locally 
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at least 20% lower than in the reference country or countries.
b. Low: It is not explicitly covered for the indications evaluated (or was not considered 
cost-effective2) in one or two countries with a higher GDP, and there is no indication 
that the price of the technology, adjusted for health expenditure per capita, is locally 
at least 20% lower than in the reference country or countries. 
c. Moderate: It is explicitly covered (or was considered cost-effective) for the indications 
evaluated in one or two countries with similar or lower GDP within a basket of selected 
countries (for example, for Argentina the basket of countries to be evaluated could 
consist of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay), and there is no 
indication that the price, adjusted for health expenditure per capita, is locally 20% 
higher or higher than in the reference country or countries.
d. High: It is explicitly covered (or was considered cost-effective) for the indications evaluated 
in three or more countries with similar or lower GDP in a basket of selected countries, and 
there is no indication that the price, adjusted for health expenditure per capita, is locally 
higher by 20% or more than in the reference country or countries. In all the examples below, 
price adjustments based on per capita health expenditure should be made as follows: 
where P
A 




are the price and health expenditure per capita in the reference country of origin; and 
Gpc
A
 is health expenditure per capita in the country to which we are transferring the 
price. See examples below.
Examples from Costa Rica (GDP per capita US$11,700 and health expenditure per capita 
US$889) provide an illustration. Technology 1 was evaluated by the Technology Incorporation 
Commission (CONITEC) in Brazil (GDP per capita US$9,900 and health expenditure per 
capita US$1,015), and the decision was made to incorporate it into the coverage of the 
Unified Health System (known by the Portuguese acronym SUS). The negotiated price of 
the technology for the SUS in Brazil was US$1,300, which would yield an equivalent price 
for Costa Rica, adjusted for health expenditure, of US$1.139 (Equation 1). If the price of 
technology in Costa Rica does not substantially exceed this reference price (for example, by 
20% or more), this would be an indication that it could be considered cost-effective.
Technology Example 2: A technology priced at US$2,500 was excluded from coverage by 
Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) (GDP per capita US$50,000 
and health expenditure per capita US$5,000). The equivalent price for Costa Rica, adjusted 
for health expenditure (Equation 1), would be US$445. If the price of the technology in 
Costa Rica is not substantially lower than this reference price, this could be considered an 
indication that it would not be cost-effective.
Technology Example 3: Priced at $4,500, it was assessed by NICE in England (GDP per 
capita US$40,500 and health expenditure per capita US$3,960) and rejected as not cost-
effective. After a series of negotiations with the manufacturer, discounts and special access 
agreements were reached and the technology was included, but the current price for the 
English health system is unknown. The equivalent price for Costa Rica, adjusted for health 
expenditure, based on the public price in England (US$4,500), would be US$1,010 (Equation 
1). If the price of the technology in Costa Rica is not substantially lower than this reference 
price, this would be an indication that it would not be cost-effective.
Crude extrapolation of the cost-effectiveness of economic evaluations (EE) conducted in 
other jurisdictions
Economic evaluations from other jurisdictions should be prioritized as follows: good quality 
evaluations by other countries in the same region and with a similar GDP, prioritizing 
evaluations conducted by or presented to public HTA agencies; good quality evaluations 
conducted in another region in countries with a similar GDP, prioritizing evaluations 
conducted by or presented to public HTA agencies; and good quality evaluations from 
other countries, prioritizing evaluations conducted by or presented to public HTA agencies.
The results of the ICER are adjusted to the local context through the price of the technology:
where ICER
A




 are the ICER and 
price of the technology in the EE’s country of origin; and P
A
 is the price in the country to 
which we are moving the ICER.
This very simplified approach is most useful in the case of high-cost technologies (such 
as cancer drugs) in which the price of the new technology is more likely to represent the 
largest proportion of the cost differential between the intervention and its comparator. 
While it has many limitations and involves a very imprecise measurement of what the true 
ICER might be, it can provide rough information about the likelihood of a technology being 
cost-effective. Because the decision rules for determining cost-effectiveness are directly 
related to health expenditure per capita, since a country with higher health expenditure may 
have a higher cost-effectiveness threshold (see Chapters 3 and 4), if a technology was cost-
effective in a country with a health expenditure four times higher, it is likely that it will also 
be cost-effective in your country if its price is four times lower. This is what this approach is 
trying to capture, in a very general way.
The probability that the technology or intervention will be considered cost-effective in your 
environment by extrapolating the cost-effectiveness of evaluations conducted in other 
jurisdictions will be categorized as very low, low, moderate, or high (or will be considered 
uncertain) according to the following parameters:
a. Very low probability: The adjusted ICER is greater than 2x the cost-effectiveness 
2 If when deciding whether to include the technology the country deemed that it was not cost-effective, this 
is the data that must be considered when evaluating this dimension, even if the technology has later been co-
vered or included in the benefits package of the country in question. This is something that happens in some 
jurisdictions (such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia), where often, the cost-effectiveness result 
is adverse, but after negotiations (which are usually confidential), the country or province decides to include 
the technology. The reverse is also true:  If the technology was considered cost-effective in a country, this is 
the data that must be considered, even if it was subsequently not covered due to other considerations. See 
examples in the text.
64 65
threshold defined for that technology and indication in your jurisdiction.
b. Low probability: The adjusted ICER is greater than the cost-effectiveness threshold 
defined for that technology and indication (and less than 2x the threshold) in your 
jurisdiction.
c. Moderate Probability: The adjusted ICER is less than the cost-effectiveness threshold 
defined for that technology and indication in your jurisdiction.
d. High Probability: The adjusted ICER is less than 1/2 the cost-effectiveness threshold 
defined for that technology and indication in your jurisdiction
Let’s look at an example from the perspective of Costa Rica (GDP per capita US$11,700 and 
health expenditure per capita US$889). An economic evaluation in Spain (GDP per capita 
US$26,600 and health expenditure per capita US$2,400) found an ICER of US$38,000 per 
QALY for a technology whose price is US$1,300. In Costa Rica the price of this technology 
is US$650, resulting in an adjusted ICER of US$19,000 (Equation 2). According to Costa 
Rica’s opportunity cost threshold (US$9,041 – see Chapter 3), this intervention would not 
be cost-effective. However, we believe that this is a very effective cancer drug to improve 
the overall survival of patients, so Costa Rica could eventually consider its coverage up to a 
threshold of US$22,604 (based on the decision modifiers, it is a category C technology, so 
in our example, society could agree to pay up to 2.5 times the opportunity cost threshold. 
See Chapter 4). In this case, this would be an indication that there is a moderate probability 
that it will be cost-effective in Costa Rica, since the adjusted ICER is within the threshold 
range considered acceptable for this category. If the price in Costa Rica were at an even 
lower value – for example, less than US$400, this could be considered an indication of a 
high probability that it will be cost-effective, as the adjusted ICER would fall to less than half 
of this category C threshold.
Estimation of a “cost-effect ratio” based on the results of clinical studies.
This approach could be considered in the case of technologies targeting serious illnesses 
with reduced life expectancy, in which the technology would be expected to produce a 
benefit considered relevant in terms of increasing overall survival and/or adjusted for quality 
of life, and when, given the high price of the technology in relation to the cost of managing 
the illness, the incremental cost of the new technology is considered to represent the 
largest proportion of the cost differential between the new intervention, which includes the 
technology in question, and the relevant comparator(s) in your jurisdiction.
Estimation of the “cost-effect ratio” is based on the difference between the local cost of 
treatment with the new technology and its comparator, and the effect observed in clinical 
trials when information is available on the impact of the technology in terms of overall 
survival and/or survival adjusted for quality of life. This approach could be applied in the 
case of technologies whose observed benefit in randomized controlled trials is greater than 
3 months of overall survival (or its equivalent in terms of survival adjusted for quality of life). 
In such cases, where there were no global survival data and/or QALYs, and if considered 
appropriate, the estimate of overall survival could be based on the available progression-
free survival data (e.g., difference in overall survival equivalent to one-third of the difference 
in progression-free survival), although this point is more controversial.
An example, again from the perspective of Costa Rica (GDP per capita US$11,700 and health 
expenditure per capita of US$889): a study considered to be of very good quality that 
compared the new treatment with the customary treatment, found a significant improvement 
in survival (1.2 additional years of life), with a degree of uncertainty considered reasonable 
(CI95%, 0.8 to 1.4 years). The cost per patient of this new treatment, which is combined with 
the current treatment, is US$14,000; therefore, it does not significantly replace expenses 
for other treatments. The “cost-effect” ratio will be US$~11,700 (14,000/1.2) per year of 
life, which would not be cost-effective according to the opportunity cost in Costa Rica. If 
classified in category B as presented in Chapter 4, it could then be considered that there is a 
moderate probability that it will be cost-effective, since it is within the limits of the threshold 
defined for this category in Costa Rica (US$13,500, or up to 1.5 GDP per capita per QALY).
At the other extreme, a drug that offers only a modest improvement in survival (0.3 QALYs) 
at a cost of US$20,000 would be indicative of a very low probability of being cost-effective 
in Costa Rica, since its cost-effectiveness ratio more than doubles the threshold, even in 
category C.
How to consolidate the information surveyed?
Table 6-1 presented an example of what the results of the information survey for a hypothetical 
technology could be. As we can see, it may be the case to find discordant information, in 
some cases indicating a greater or lesser probability of cost-effectiveness at the local level. 
This is to be expected, because these are very approximate measures. The information should 
be integrated into a summary conclusion through a deliberative process that can take other 
characteristics of the information gathered into account (such as the degree of confidence 
in the results, similarity to the countries from which the information was obtained, etc.).
It is important to point out again that this guidance is indicative and should be tailored to 
the local decision-making context. For example, the more “unique” the health technology 
status for the particular indication(s) for your jurisdiction, the less that information from 
other jurisdictions may be extrapolated. In this vein, the approach described could not be 
applied or would have even more limitations in case of technologies related to local or 
endemic health problems (e.g., Chagas disease in some LAC countries), since this limits the 
ability to extrapolate information from other contexts.
So far, we have discussed how to evaluate the probability that a technology will be cost-
effective in your jurisdiction in the absence of local studies. Next, we will propose an 
approach to integrate this piece of information with other domains such as the quality 
of evidence, magnitude of benefit, budgetary impact, and other local contextual factors. 
The objective is to establish whether the information we have is favorable, unfavorable, or 
uncertain regarding the decision on coverage or inclusion of the technology in the benefits 
package.
Economic evidence could be considered favorable to the inclusion of technology under 
the following conditions:
1. A good quality economic evaluation performed locally shows that the technology is 
cost-saving; or
2. A good quality economic evaluation performed locally shows that the technology is 
cost-effective according to the decision rule for its category and does not represent 
a high budgetary impact; or
3. There is no good quality economic evaluation performed locally, but all of the following 
conditions are met: 
a. The magnitude of the benefit is considered relevant and the quality of evidence is 
considered appropriate;
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b. It does not represent a high budgetary impact;
c. The evaluation of the probability that it is cost-effective is considered high 
according to indirect estimates;
Or all the following conditions:
d. The incremental cost that the technology represents with respect to its comparator 
is not high;
e. The affected population is small;
f. The magnitude of the benefit is considered relevant and the quality of evidence is 
considered appropriate;
g. It does not represent a high budgetary impact; and, 
h. The evaluation of the probability that it is cost-effective is not considered low or 
very low according to indirect estimates.
Economic evidence could be considered unfavorable to the inclusion of technology under 
the following conditions:
a. A good quality economic evaluation performed locally shows that the technology is 
not cost-effective: or
b. The assessment of the probability of its being cost-effective is considered very low 
according to indirect estimates; or
c. The assessment of the probability that it will be cost-effective is considered low 
according to indirect estimates, and the incremental cost that the technology represents 
with respect to its comparator is high or represents a high budgetary impact. 
Finally, the economic evidence regarding the inclusion of the technology could be considered 
uncertain when none of the conditions described in the previous categories are met.
6.6. Final remarks
In this chapter we try to outline a possible proposal for integrating economic evidence - 
almost always from other jurisdictions - into decision-making in your jurisdiction. It is not 
intended to be used routinely in all decisions to cover or include technologies in the benefits 
package, since it is not advisable to introduce technologies or interventions without knowing 
with certainty their cost-effectiveness at the local level. However, this information could 
be useful in many circumstances where requiring or conducting comprehensive economic 
evaluations is not possible. It can also serve as a guide for the final decision to incorporate 
or reject a technology under conditions where preliminary decisions must be made before 
a proper assessment of local cost-effectiveness is available.
If such a process is used to temporarily decide whether to reject or include a local technology 
on the basis of “indirect” economic evidence, it is suggested that the follow-up of these 
decisions be in some way different from decisions made with local economic evidence. 
When deciding to include a technology without direct economic evidence, it could be done 
within a supervised framework in which its performance in the jurisdiction in question and 
its cost-effectiveness at the local level can be monitored. This process can also aid in the 
development of special contracting and purchasing models for cases in which a preliminary 
decision or one with a high degree of uncertainty is made that exceeds what is discussed 
in this document but may include mandatory records to monitor performance, risk-sharing 
agreements, and greater restrictions on its indication (for example, limiting its indication to 
certain services or hospitals).
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7. IMPLEMENTATION OF HTAs IN FRAGMENTED HEALTH 
SYSTEMS
Most Latin American countries have fragmented health systems, where public, social security, 
and private subsystems, or state or provincial health systems, coexist with significant 
autonomy. This contrasts with countries where HTA is more established, as is the case in 
Europe, Canada, and Australia. Many of these countries have a “single payer,” the national 
health system. Others have a national insurance system or an integrated social security 
sector with multiple payers acting in a coordinated manner (for example, they may have 
a national list of covered drugs). In these countries, the role of HTA is clearer, in the sense 
that a single technology assessment can inform and affect a wide range of policymakers 
across the entire health system at the national level. In a fragmented system, in contrast, 
conducting and using health technology assessment involves some challenges. This chapter 
identifies and discusses some aspects of the use of HTA in fragmented health systems and 
proposes a number of practical elements to bear in mind when conducting HTAs in these 
contexts.
7.1. Challenges in fragmented health systems
The most obvious difference between decision-makers in different fields is that they may 
have different information or data needs for HTA and/or the decision-making process. The 
cost structure may be different in the various subsectors or regions, which implies that the 
HTA should, for example, include an interactive model that allows decision-makers to use 
their own cost data. The same may hold true for other parameters. On the other hand, if 
therapeutic alternatives for the technology in question vary from sector to sector, it may 
be more difficult for an assessment to provide the necessary information for everyone. For 
example, it may be that treatments are being used in the private sector that are not yet 
used in the public sector. In that case, the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio is going to be 
different in those subsectors because it will refer to different comparators. 
Since each sector is independent, different decision rules are likely to apply when including 
new technologies. This may affect the use or relevance of the health technology assessment. 
A critical point is the use of a cost-effectiveness threshold. If the cost-effectiveness threshold 
is related to the opportunity cost, the threshold may differ from subsector to subsector.
The potential impact of these different thresholds by subsector or region has already been 
discussed in Latin America (Lamfre et al., 2018). A study by RedArEts (Network of non-profit 
public institutions dedicated to the evaluation of health technologies in Argentina) found 
that the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of colon cancer screening in patients aged 
50-75 could vary from 0.15 to 0.42 GDP per capita per QALY depending on the province 
analyzed (Hasdeu et al., 2017).
The existence of different thresholds within a country or region is not an unsolvable problem. 
A single assessment can be conducted and subsequently tailored to the various subsectors 
(i.e., using a model that allows decision-makers to use different parameters for each sector); 
different decisions can then be made on whether to include the technology in each sector. 
This usually occurs in fragmented or heterogeneous health systems, either with or without 
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HTAs. Typically, newer treatments are more likely to be available in the private sector rather 
than the public sector, or in large urban centers rather than rural areas. If per capita health 
expenditure is higher in the private sector than the public sector, it is possible that using the 
same evaluation, a technology is cost-effective in the private sector and therefore included 
but not so in the public sector, or included in both sectors but with different prices. In other 
cases, it is more complicated for a single assessment to be relevant to all policymakers; 
for example, when the customary care (therapeutic alternatives or comparators for the 
pathology in question) is different in different subsectors. 
In addition to the technical difficulties, there are the political ones. Currently, different 
subsectors make different decisions about the inclusion of technologies. However, if a more 
explicit decision-making process begins to be implemented using HTA, and the heterogeneity 
among sectors is explicitly taken into account – for example, using different thresholds – 
these differences will become more visible, which can be politically sensitive. A potential 
advantage is that having different thresholds does not necessarily imply differences in access: 
they can be used to achieve lower prices in sectors or regions with lower health budgets 
(and therefore lower thresholds). Another positive aspect is that the introduction of HTAs 
can be used to achieve greater convergence toward a more unified and transparent decision-
making process among the different subsectors, if this is a political goal – for example, in 
countries moving toward universal health coverage. In the medium and long term, this will 
probably end up promoting greater convergence of the thresholds used by the different 
subsectors in the decision-making process, and consequently, greater convergence in 
access and budgets as well. The use of HTAs will make these differences among subsectors 
more visible and quantifiable and will be able to inform regulatory decisions and policies to 
achieve greater equity. 
Finally, implementation of HTAs in any jurisdiction will lead to greater transparency in the 
decision-making process. Studies in different countries show that this level of transparency 
in decision-making processes varies widely (Drummond et al., 2008). There is no “adequate” 
level of transparency, but it should be borne in mind that this level may differ among sectors 
in the same jurisdiction (i.e., the private sector may limit transparency due to business 
confidentiality).
7.2. Discussion points for Latin American countries and preliminary 
proposal of a methodology for estimating the opportunity cost 
in different health subsectors
The following are some of the questions that may arise when countries with fragmented 
health systems seek to include HTAs in their decision-making processes.
a. How can HTA documents, including the economic assessment component, be made in 
the most adaptable/transferable way possible so that they can be relevant to different 
sectors in fragmented health systems?
b. How are decision-makers in different health sectors currently making decisions on 
the introduction or rejection of new technologies, and how are HTAs expected to be 
useful in informing this decision-making?
c. Should discussions be opened on the use of cost-effectiveness thresholds, especially 
on whether it is necessary to set different values for each sector? If so, should these 
thresholds remain different over time, or would they be expected to converge in the 
long run?
d. How politically feasible is the explicit use of different cost-effectiveness thresholds by 
subsector?
Tailoring thresholds to different subsectors within the same country
The previous chapters proposed preliminary estimates of opportunity cost thresholds, 
budgetary impact, and decision-making modifiers or rules for the countries of the region. 
This section will issue a preliminary proposal to tailor these thresholds to different contexts 
within a country, whether different health subsectors, geographical areas, or something 
else, based on per capita health expenditure.
In order to apply this approach, it is necessary to know the per capita health expenditure 
for each subsector or region – information that is not always readily available. Its estimation 
involves a number of complexities, since the per capita health expenditure of a given subsector 
is made up of a series of components, all of which must be considered. For example, per 
capita health expenditure on social security in a given country consists of:
• The contributions and deductions made by employees and employers, in addition 
to other contributions or subsidies that may eventually be received (from the state, 
for example) and are intended for health (excluding, for example, benefits such as 
pensions or vacation pay)
• The out-of-pocket expenditure of beneficiaries, which in some countries in the region 
may account for a very high proportion of total health expenditure
• The proportion of public expenditure on health that (directly or indirectly) targets 
the population covered by social security: e.g., expenditure such as health promotion 
campaigns or certain vaccines; or expenses for institutions such as the medicines 
regulatory agency or national institutes; or public sector direct health care expenditures 
used by social security beneficiaries (e.g., in rural areas where the only health effectors 
are in the public sector) 
In order to estimate the thresholds by subsector, it is necessary to begin by obtaining 
estimates of how much the health expenditure per capita represents in each subsector. In 
some cases, health expenditure by region, state, or province could be approximated based 
on GDP per capita. Based on the data on health expenditure per capita for the subsector or 
region, the different thresholds may be derived using the following approximation:
where S
est
 is the parameter estimate for a specific sector; C
est
 is the estimation of the 
parameter at the country level; S
HEpc
 is the health expenditure per capita in the sector in 
which the estimate is to be made; and C
Hepc
 is the per capita health expenditure at the 
country level. Table 7-1 shows, by way of example, the extrapolation of opportunity cost and 
high budgetary impact thresholds to different subsectors of Argentina.
Table 7-1 Estimate of opportunity cost threshold and budgetary 
impact by subsector in Argentina (US$ 2016)
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Note: Per capita health expenditure values by subsector are preliminary estimates currently under development
Table 7-2 shows the potential impact on cost-effectiveness thresholds of applying different 
opportunity costs per sector in Argentina for the categories and decision rules described in 
Chapter 4,.
Table 7-2 Threshold or upper limit to consider the cost-effectiveness of 
a health technology acceptable in each category in the different health 
subsectors in Argentina: central estimate and lower and upper limit (US$ 
2016 and as a fraction of GDP)
As can be seen, the implications for decision-making can be very substantial. For example, 
a cancer drug that offers a significant improvement in overall survival (category C) could be 
considered cost-effective up to a maximum of US$20,246 per QALY in the public sector, but 
this limit could reach up to US$47,873 in the private sector.
7.3. Final remarks
Using different thresholds for different sectors has technical, political and ethical 
implications. Not all jurisdictions will necessarily want to move in this direction, nor can it be 
recommended as the way forward for all countries with fragmented systems. However, it is 
likely that different decisions are now being made by sector in all countries with fragmented 
systems. These decisions may be more or less explicit, but they are surely being reflected in 
different levels of access to health services by the beneficiary populations of the different 
subsectors or regions. 
Therefore, regardless of whether the decision to use different thresholds is made, estimating 
the opportunity cost in each subsector or region, these thresholds are necessary to help 
decision-makers appreciate the implications of health decisions – above all, in terms of how 
much benefit the system as a whole will gain or lose by including a certain technology or 
intervention in the coverage plan (Sculpher et al., 2017). In the example of the cancer drug 
mentioned above, knowing the value at which it can be cost-effective in each subsector can 
lead to more efficient price negotiations. Making decisions without knowing the opportunity 
cost for each subsector or region implies ignoring not only the health impact of the decisions 
but the degree of equity or inequality that they imply.
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APPENDIX I - Preparation of the preliminary report for 
Argentina
In 2019, Argentina was discussing the potential creation of a Health Technology Assessment 
Agency. In this context, the IDB asked the authors of this document for a report focusing on 
some of the key technical aspects that an HTA agency might have to address in its first two 
years of existence, especially in terms of the use of economic evidence for decision-making 
on the allocation of health resources. 
For the preparation of this report for Argentina, a series of key actors were identified, and 
meetings were held with the aim of achieving a document that took different perspectives 
and the country and regional context into account. These actors included patient and user 
representatives, health funders, national and/or regional government policymakers and 
regulators, industry, academia, and HTA units or agencies. They were brought together to 
hear their opinions, bring new perspectives, and enrich the discussions. This interaction 
included invitations to submit relevant material, two in-person discussion and work meetings 
on the drafts of the document, and a public event to present the preliminary findings to a 
wider audience, as detailed in the activities schedule below:
Note: All actors did not necessarily participate in all stages
It is important to note that, although the perspectives and contributions of all participants 
were considered in the preparation of this document, its content is ultimately the authors’ 
responsibility and does not necessarily reflect the opinion or position of the organizations, 
institutions, experts and/or referents consulted.
Institutions and organizations invited to participate:
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Health and Social Action, Argentina: National Commission 
for the Evaluation of Health Technologies, Directorate of Health Economics (CONETEC), 
Directorate of Quality, Patient Representatives at CONETEC; Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB); National Administration of Drugs, Food, and Medical Technology of 
Argentina(ANMAT); Superintendency of Health Services (SSS); National Institute of Social 
Services for Retirees and Pensioners (INSSJP-PAMI); Federal Health Council (COFESA); 
Council of Provincial Works and Social Services of the Argentine Republic (COSSPRA); 
Argentine Network for Health Technology Assessment (RedArETS); Obra Social para el 
Personal de Obras y Servicios Sanitarios (OSOSS); Federación Argentina de Mutuales de 
Salud (FAMSA); ISALUD University; Institute of Clinical and Health Effectiveness (IECS); 
Association of Private Medicine Entities (ADEMP); Asociación Civil de Actividades Médicas 
(ACAMI); Business Chamber of Pharmaceutical Laboratories (COOPERALA); Argentine 
Chamber of Medicinal Specialties (CAEMe); Chamber of Medical Diagnostic Institutions 
(CADIME); Industrial Chamber of Argentine Pharmaceutical Laboratories (CILFA), Argentine 
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